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S T A T E M E N T O F J U R I S D I C T I O N 
1 fit* i Hah Niipri'mr < "n nil has a|))n1Lilr IIIHMIH dun in 1 his matter pursuant to Utah 
CodeAnn.§78A-3-102(3)(c)(ii)(20()9). ' " " 
ISSUES P R E S E N T E D F O R R E V I E W 
I ;; -i. ,; - . ,-Miiiii.sSH)n correctly determine Ilia* S u m m i t ^ well was started 
b * - • =• • - a *
 w,: .-.;.. ...liijijvUu and ^hit- in 
during 1983-1W-1. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
U tah apj)cllalc courts grant no deference to the Commission's legal coiielusioii^ 
bun "•). . - . .*-• i * i -UIK i i, in) grani> vlLs^ictionfofhc 
Commission.1 Llali Code Ann. § 59-i-oiu\ V< ; -a u i C u I .*MK> -
TU
"
U
 State Tax Common, 2009 I T I K *; \ . ? ! I I ' J i J 8 _ , J ^ , . B U I v\hcn the iegislaluic 5 
-\-- 1 - oc discerned through traditional methods r-fstatuton jonsiruet iV^ '"ii 1 -
appropriate lo coiu'lmh' (h i( Hit" Icgislainn1 lias th legated autlHiiity lo the agencytodeci .de 
the issue," Mor ton I n t ' l Inc. v. Audit ing 1 ) i , . • *- ) 
(Superseded by statute on grounds not relevant). Addit ional!) , tax statutes arc b inary 
1
 oiiMl" ua l against one seeking exemption,,, and "all ambiguities are to be r e s o l w d in lav »r 
of taxation. " I d . at V)l Macl 'arlanc v> Utah Stale l ax Coinm n, ^uiio 1 • 1 j j . ' 
1 rITie interpretation of a statute also constitutes a qucs; w;, ,M ;au thai UiiS Court 
reviews for correctness. A B C O Enters. , 2009 U T 3 6 , 1 7 . 
1 
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P.3d 1116, 1118. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISION 
Utah Code Annotated § 59-5-102(5) (West Supp. 2011)2 
A tax is not imposed under this section upon: 
(a) stripper wells, unless the exemption prevents the severance tax from being 
treated as a deduction for federal tax purposes; 
(b) the first 12 months of production for wildcat wells started after January 1, 
1990; or 
(c) the first six months of production for development wells started after January 1, 
1990. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Superior Oil Company began drilling on the Horsehead Point 18-44 well, entity 
number 6031 (the "Well") on August 28, 1983. (R. 66). The Well was first produced on 
August 14, 1984, and Superior completed the Well on August 16, 1984. (R. 93). After 
conducting flow test operations to measure the flow of natural gas, Superior shut-in the 
completed Well on August 20, 1984. (R. 67). 
Summit Operating, LLC ("Summit") acquired its interest in the Well in June 2006. 
(R.28). Summit began its production on January 7, 2008. (R. 28). 
On December 17,2009, the Auditing Division of the Utah State Tax Commission 
("Division") issued a Statutory Notice to Summit for the period of January 1, 2008 
2
 For convenience, the current version of the statute is cited. It is identical to the 
version in effect during the period. 
2 
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through December 31, ? (HIS umlii) ini' SIIMMIM' nl ii s euTan te tax deficiency in the 
amount of $66,916.43, plus, accrued interest of $2.()8C^ W a lolal assessmchl ul 
$69,006.42, (R. 66). The deficiency resulted from the Division's decision to deny ;:-' 
- • - * -,!• - > . vi.vuu>i...i exemption under Utah Code Section 59-5-102(5), which 
provides that *, ? MX months oi pi junction for 
development wells started a i l u Januar . : t l 
,;. •. . Summit appealed the. Division's assessment to the Utah' State T 
I I I he eotiipany argued that under Section 59 5-102(5), it did not owe: severance tax on 
the Well.for the period helweeu Jaiiua une 200. * °. W) The P:\ isi. 
filed for sum mary judgmein and argued the U r: m 
1983, and,, therefore, did no! Liualifv for line severance tax exemption which .applies tc • 
well • started allet '-.UM * * - •- r! 13, 22). Summit filed a cross-motion for summary 
judgment, and. ask : •• « -u i .:.,ne that 1 lie W ell had "not been "started" 
until January 2008, when Summit began c o m m n v u l pi»MIIIH linn 1k .!<>• 1 /, M* in), 
• ^  Januarv 6. 2011 e . fomniissh-ri concluded that "the Section 59-^- I 0 , ? ( 5 ) H ) 
•
 M
 ; •,:• -eiis that were drilled after January 1, ^ °00" and granted the 
D m ^ i o n s motion ioi b • ,n.:;;.. imiely appealed. (R, 74) 
S U M M A R Y O F A R G U M E M i 
• I 'he Commission correctly determined that under the plain unambiguous language 
* d (In J;tf life. (In "VV'i -II Siunnul purchased in 2006 was started prior to January 1, 1990, 
3 
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and therefore, does not qualify for the tax exemption for "development wells started after 
January 1, 1990." The undisputed facts are that drilling began August 28, 1983. The i 
Well produced and was completed in 1984, prior to being shut in. (R. 66, 67). 
Summit's proposed interpretation is not consistent with the plain language of the
 { 
statute, not consistent with proper grammatical construction, and common usage in the oil 
and gas industry. Moreover, Summit's preferred reading is not consistent with other 
courts' construction of the term "started" or with other state statutes defining that term in 
similar contexts. ; ri-^y-" rzi^> *.';u; t.;;v:-^ 
Finally, should the Court resort to legislative history to determine legislative intent, 
that history supports theCommission's reading of the statute. In construing a tax 
exemption, the Court must construe the exemption narrowly and resolve any ambiguity 
against the party seeking exemption. Parson Asphalt v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 617 
P.2d397,398 (Utah 1980). , .-.. • ; • 
ARGUMENT 
L THE COMMISSION RIGHTFULLY GRANTED THE DIVISION'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BECAUSE THIS IS AN ISSUE 
OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION. 
Summary judgment is proper where "there is. no genuine issue as to any material 
fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Utah R. Civ. P. 
56(c). Matters of statutory interpretation present questions of law. ABCO, 2009 UT 36, 
j 7 (quoting MacFarlane. 2006 UT 25, ^  9,134 P.3d 1116,1118). Summit "and the 
4 
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Commission agree no genuine issue exists as to any material fact. (R 69), Those facts 
are that drilling began on August 28, 1983. The. Well first piodueed on /Uiiiusl 14, 1984. 
The Well was completed on August 16, 1984, and shut-in on August 20, 1984. Summit 
acquired its interest in June 2006 and began its production January 2008* 
The statutory language is cJ * ^ an exemption for, "the first six 
months of production for development wells started after Jantian I I ^90, /Vpplying the 
law as written to the undisputed facts, the Commission properly granted summary 
judgment by ruling the well was started before January 1, 1990, and therefore, did not 
qualify for the exemption. 
IL THE COMMISSION CORRECTLY INTERPREI ED THAT SECTION 59-
5-102(5) APPLIES ONLY TO WELLS "SPUDDED" AFTER JANUARY 1, 
1990. 
1o interpret a statute, this Court looks first to the statute's plain language. 
MacFarlane.2Q.06UT25. % 12: ExxonMobil Corp. v.. Utah State Tax Common. 2003 UT 
53, f 14, 86 P.3d 706, 710. When a statute is unambiguous, the Coin 1 l< >< >Ls im further 
than the statute's plain language. MacFarlane, 2006 UT 25, % 12. If the language is 
ambiguous, the Coiirt looks to legislative intent and policy considerations for guidance. 
ExxonMobil 2003 UT -53. f 14. 
A Section 59-5-102(5) Is Unambiguous and Suppoi is ilir < 'ominission's 
Conclusion* 
A statute's language is plain and its meaning unambiguous where a literal reading 
of the statute, giving words If n n usiiiil ami accepted meanings, does not render the statute 
5 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
( 
unreasonably inoperable or confused. See US Xpress, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Common, 
886 P.2d 1115, 1118 (Utah App. 1994) (citing Amax Magnesium Corp. v. State Tax ( 
Common, 796 P.2d 1256, 1258 (Utah 1990); Clover v. Snowbird Ski Resort. 808 P.2d 
1037, 1045 (Utah 1991). Moreover, the Court presumes the legislature used "each term .
 ( 
. . advisedly," and gives them their plain and ordinary meaning. MacFarlane, 2006 UT 
25, \ 12 (quoting Carrier v. Salt Lake County. 2004 UT 98, T[30, 104 P.3d 1208. 1216). 
i 
Here, section 59-5-102(5) unambiguously exempts from severance tax the initial 
production of wells started after January 1, 1990. 
Common usage of the word "started" and its common understanding in the oil and 
gas industry support the Commission's determination that the term "started" refers to 
some event in connection with the initial drilling of a well. Similarly, basic rules of
 ( 
grammar support the conclusion that "started" modifies "wells" and not "production." 
1. The Commission's Interpretation of Section 59-5-102(5) Is a 
Literal Reading of the Statute. 
Section 59-5-102(5) states that a severance tax is not imposed upon: "the first six 
months of production for development wells started after January 1, 1990." (emphasis 
added). The Commission's interpretation constitutes a literal reading of the statute. 
In common usage, the word "started" is self-explanatory. Notwithstanding, 
Merriam-Webster Dictionary provides some pertinent guidance: "to come into being; "to 
begin an activity or undertaking"; "to bring into being." Merriam-Webster.com, 
Definition of Start, http://www.memam-webster.coi^ visited June 
6 
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21, 2011). Webster's II New Riverside University Dictionary (1988) offers similar 
assistance,. There, "start" is defined as "To begin an activity or movement"; "to have a 
beginning: COMMENCE"; "to begin." 
Section ,l1 s 102(5) provides an exemption for "development wells started after 
January 1, 1990." A well is started wl ten it comes "into being" or, when drilling begins. 
That moment is documented as the "spud date," ilk* < K , bit nierces the earth. In 
this case, drilling began August 28, 1983, (R. 13, 27, 66) and the Well was completed 
Augusl 1 (>, 1 i,K I i K! l) ) A literal reading of the statute would require that the Well be 
started sometime prior to the dale if is completed. The Commission found the Well 
began, or was started, when drilling began. That finding is straight forward, and 
constitutes a literal reading of the language of the statute. It should be affirmed. 
2. A Well is Started When It is Spudded or Upon Preparation of 
Spudding. 
A well begins, or commences, when it is spudded, or at some point in preparation 
of the spudding. See Richard W. Hemingway, The Law of Oil and Gas ; -J < n *; 1991). 
("Sue I) openif i\ r language has been generally interpreted to mean that operations for the 
drilling of a well, and not the actual spudding in or drilling of the hole, must have 
commenced prior to the end of the primary term.") Eugene Kuntz, A Treatise on the Law 
of Oil and Gas Vol. 3 (1989) ("There is considerable authority with respect lo u liil 
constitutes 'commencement of a weir or 'commencement of operations for drilling of a 
well....'9'). See Ap], finition is established by nearly 100 years of case law and 
7 
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is based on language found in a standard oil and gas leases. 
In Allen v. Palmer. 209 P.2d 502, 504-05 (Okla. 1949), an Oklahoma court noted < 
that starting a well begins when the drill bit pierces the earth. (See Kerr-McGee Corp. v. 
Northern. 500 F.Supp. 624 |^9 (D.C. Wyo. 1980) (rev'd on other grounds, 673 F.2d 323
 ( 
(10th Cir. 1982) (noting that a well is commenced when it is spudded)); see also Vickers 
v. Peaker. 227 Ark. 587, 591 (1957) (holding that a severance tax exemption cannot apply 
because drilling never began.) As early as 1921, the Missouri Court of Appeals 
determined that a lease provision requiring the lessee to "begin operations on said land" 
had been fulfilled by the lessee's preparation to begin drilling. Cox v. Miller. 227 S.W. ' 
652, 652-53 (Mo. App. 1921). Similarly, in Hilliard v. Franzheim. a Louisiana Court of 
Appeals determined that the terms "start" and "commence" in an oil well lease referred to 
preparatory work for drilling. Id., 180 So. 2d 746, 748 (La. App. 1965). There, the lease 
called for a well "to be started within 90 days." Id. at 747. The court determined that, 
although "started" was not necessarily synonymous with "spudded," both words spoke to 
stages of the drilling process. See id. at 747-48. 
These cases are reflective of the use of "started," "commenced," or "began" in the 
oil and gas industry. Habendum clauses of most oil and gas leases make clear that 
"starting," "commencement," or "beginning" a well is connected to the well's drilling, not 
its production. See John S. Lowe, et. al, Cases and Materials on Oil and Gas Law 152 (4th 
ed. 2002) ("The primary term of an oil and gas lease is a fixed term of years during which 
8 
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the lessee has the right...to explore for oil and gas or to drill lor oil and gas....The primary 
term...sets the maximum period for which the lessee can maintain the lease right ^ ut 
drillii .:.i-. property.") [hereinafter, Lowe]. Appendix C. In essence, the purpose of 
the primary term of the Lease is to encourage the lessee locate an appropriate site and to 
begin to drill or start the well. See Hemingway, supra at 261-264. ^ 
Summit argues that the term "start" in Section 59-5-102(5) refers to (he onset of 
commercial pioduction. Pet. Brief p. 22. But, in a standard lease, commercial production 
of a well is not a factor unl i I a lessee propels past the primary term and into the secondary 
term—in other words, production is commonly seen as a secondary step in the life of an 
oil and gas well. See id.; Lowe, supra at 152 (explaining the difference1 hetu tvn ihe 
primar) and secondary terms and their functions in habendum clauses). The industry 
standard, as evidenced b> (fit primary term of the lease, provides that a well begins when 
drilling operations have commenced. See Kuntz, supra a! 6K ("The most simple form of 
drilling clause which requires commencement of a well...makes reference io n "well" as 
the thing to be commenced.") Therefore, using the common meaning of the word "start," 
and the common understanding o \- *• ^ ell begins, the Section 59-5-102(5) 
exemption applies only to wells whose drilling operations conunenced on or after January 
1, 1990. Summit's Well was already completed by that date. (R. ioj . 
Suiiiiiiit.au tention is belied by other oil and gas definitions. Summit admits that 
the Well was "shut-in" on August 20, ! ^ \ < Petitioner's Brief, Fact c). The Division of 
9 
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Oil, Gas and Mining defines "shut-in well" as "a well that is completed, is shown to be 
capable ofproduction in paying quantities, and is not presently operated." Utah Admin. < 
Code R649-1-1 (emphasis added). Summit's contention, then, that "started" refers to 
commercial production compels an untenable result. Because to accept that 
interpretation, the Court must conclude that a well, which "is completed," is not "started." 
3. Section 59-5-102(5)'s Sentence Structure Makes Clear That 
"Started" Modifies "Wells" Not "Production".
 ( 
Summit argues that the word "started" modifies "production" not "development 
wells." (Pet. Brief p. 22). But that reading does not look at the sentence as a whole and 
assumes the legislature did not carefully choose its construction of the statute. Section 
59-5-102(5) states: "A tax is not imposed under this section upon... the first six months of 
production for development wells started after January 1, 1990." The word "for" is a 
preposition and the words following it are a prepositional phrase. See Lynn Q. Troyka, 
Simon & Schuster Handbook For Writers 150, 163 (1987) (stating that "for" is a common 
preposition, and that a prepositional phrase "always starts with a preposition [and] 
functions as an adjective or adverb" and cannot stand alone). Appendix D. ; Scott Rice, 
Right Words, Right Places 178-182 (classifying "for" as a common, simple preposition) 
("Prepositional phrases acting as adjectives almost always go right after the word they 
modify...."). Appendix E. Accepting this basic English usage, the phrase "for 
development wells" directly modifies the word "production," and makes clear that it is 
the production of development wells that are exempt. 
10 
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Even still,, the phrase "started ;il'ler January I I V9(l" adds a restrictive modifier to • 
the noun phrase "development wells." Thereby iiidiialinf.' ihaf onl\ a certain class of 
development wells qualify for the exemption. See Troyka at 427-29 (explaining 
restrictive elements are modifiers and are not set off by commas because they create an 
essential meaning in the sentence). A modifying phrase describes other words or phrases. 
Id. at 288. A modifying phrase should always be placed n* closely as possible to what it 
describes. Id. Because the legislature is considered to use "each term included in Hie 
statute...advisedly," MacFarlane, 2006 UT 25, *[[ 12, (quoting Carrier v. Salt Lake County, 
2004 UT 98, % 30, 104 P.3d 1208), we must assume that the legislature placed "started" 
next to "development wells" to create a specific class of development wells that qualify 
for the exemption. 
Fron n I meaning of the word "started" and its common usage in the oil and 
gas industry, it is clear that Section 59- : u.YM applies only to wells which began drilling 
operations sometime after January 1, 1990. As. written, (he plain language of the statute 
renders it unambiguous. It is neither confusing nor inoperable. Therefore, this ( ourt need 
not look furtller. 
~. Applying Section 59.5.102(5) to Only Wells Drilled after January 1, 
1990 Is Consistent with the Legislative Intent and Stated Policy to 
Provide Incentives for New Drilling. 
Section 59-5-102(5) is clear. But should the Court find it ambiguous, applying the 
severance tax exenr to only wells drilled after January 1, 1990 comports with 
11 
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legislative intent and stated policy for three reasons. First, legislative history shows the 
legislature enacted the exemption to provide incentives for new exploration and drilling. 
Second, a grandfather clause enacted as part of the original bill shows legislative intent 
that "started" refers to drilling or some point before drilling. Finally, other state statutes 
and supporting case law from across the country find that a well "starts" at "spudding." 
1. The Legislature Intended to Provide Incentives for New Exploration 
and Drilling. 
In addition to harmonizing with the plain language of § 59-5-102(5), applying the 
severance tax exemption to only wells drilled after January 1, 1990 is consistent with 
legislative intent to provide incentives for new exploration and drilling. Section 59-5-
102(5) was created in 1990 by House Bill 110. In introducing the bill, Rep. Adams stated 
that Utah's oil patch was in serious trouble due to a decline in production, a loss in 
property value, and high unemployment. Appendix F, p. 2. Rep. Adams introduced 
H.B. 110 to address those issues through a three-pronged approach: 1) creating a sliding 
scale severance tax rate, 2) encouraging new drilling and exploration, and 3) encouraging 
increased production of existing wells by creating workover incentives. Id. at 2-4. 
Section 59-5-102(5) addresses the second prong-encouraging new drilling and 
exploration-by offering a tax holiday for new wells. See id. at 3. Rep. Adams stated that 
it cost about $80 per foot to drill oil in Utah; it costs closer to $32 per foot in the 
surrounding states. Id. at 2. He stated, 'The second part of this bill [ ] deals with the 
wildcat well." Id. at 3. Rep. Adams believed that there had only been 13 attempts to find 
12 
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new oil fields in Utah, while there had been ova 170 such attempts in Wyoming and 
Colorado, Id "In order to try to attract companies to exploi v foi nn\ oil in I "lah, there 
are significant leases around the state/' Rep. Adams said. Id. He then explained thai his 
hill offered a <a\ holiday for new producing wildcat wells. Id. Rep. Evans, who rose in 
support of the bill, also seemed lo understand that the bill sought to increase production 
by both encouraging "drilling anda/so workovers." Id ii t\ -
•;- Here as below, Summit contends H.B. 110's sole purpose was only to increase new 
oil and gas production, not encourage new drilling. Thus, "started" they assert refers to 
the date that the Well started ' VomnuTdal production" not when drilling began. This does 
not accurately reflect the bill's legislative history, which shows a clear intent to encourage 
new exploration and drilling. The legislature was very specific in defining u 
as new pi exiticl ion. Section (5) of H.B. 110 states: "New production" means any 
increased production resulting from a reconviction, workover, and new well drilling 
between January .1,. 1990, and December 31,. 1994, as nppro\ cd by flic I division." 
(Emphasis added.) Appendix G. 
Summit also argues that because an earlier draft of H.B. 110 used the word 
"spudded" instead of "started," the Legislature did not intend for started to mean spudded. 
But Summit overlooks that § 59-5-102 already containec1 laiiguage exempting "the first 
six months of production for wells started after January 1,1984," see Utah Code Ann. § 
59-5-1 U2(2)0 < ^88), making it more likely that "spudded" was changed to "started" to 
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conform to the language already present in the statute. It is equally likely that our 
Legislature, looking to how other states had defined the term "started," deemed the terms 
started and spudded as synonymous when used in this context. 
2. The Prior Statutory Scheme Gives Some Guidance.
 ( 
The current version of § 59-5-102 did not blaze new trail. The legislature first 
introduced the language "wells started after" and created an exemption for newly drilled 
wells in 1984. Then, Senate Bill 112, which amended Section 59-5-67, Occupation Tax, 
provided: ' Ik^wr ' '.'••.^n^ v ; - - -. 
An exemption from the payment of occupation tax imposed by this article is 
allowed for the period of six months following the first day of production. 
Such exemption shall apply only to wells started after the January 1, 1984 
effective date of this act. 
SB. 112, Section 1, Amending 59-5-67(6) (1984) (emphasis added). (See Appendix H, 
p. 5.) In the Senate floor debate, Senator Sowards moved to make two separate 
amendments to the bill. (Appendix G, pp. 3, 12.) First, he sought to exempt wells 
"completed after the date of this act" from paying occupation tax until they had recovered 
the cost of finding, drilling, producing and operating the new well. Id. at 3-4. Sen. 
Sowards later changed the language "completed after" to "started after." Id. at 8. In 
doing so, he was explicit that "wells that were drilled prior to this bill would not be 
exempt" because he didn't want it to apply to wells that were already in existence. Id. at 
8-9. When this amendment failed to pass, Sen. Sowards proposed a similar amendment 
which exempted only stripper wells from the tax. Id. at 12. Although this amendment 
14 
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also initially failed in the Senate, a similar amendment was eventually added to S.B. 112 
and passed into law. Just as the occupation tax in Section 59.5.67 is a predecessor to the 
severance tax found in Section 59-5-102, the exemptions created by S.B. 112 are 
predecessors to the exemptions now present in Section 59-5-102(5). And though Sen. 
Sowards' comments are not dispositive, they are persuasive in determining that a well is 
"started" when it is drilled. 
Using words similar to those proposed by Sen. Sowards's failed amend 1iieiit, Rep. 
Dmitrit It w as able to amend the bill to include "an exemption from the payment of 
occupation tax...for a period of one yi MI following the 1st day of production. (Appendix 
H, p. 4.) Such exemption shall apply only to wells started after the Januarv 1 1984 
effective date of this act." T ' While there is no discussion in the House fk - ; > ites 
about the word "started" as it is used in this amendment, Rep. Dmitrich made clear his is 
intent to incentivize for new ng. "Let's give some incentive to other oil companies 
who may want to drill in Utah....and give a little added incentive for an oil industry to 
move into Utah." (Appendix J, p. 2) (emphasis added). That legislative his* >: y 
demonstrates th.il I lie exemption which spawned the "wells started after" language was 
aimed at encouraging new drilling, not just increased production from existing wells. 
That legislative history supports the plain reading the Con KM on adopted. The 
Commission's interpretation should be affirmed. 
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3- The Grandfather Clause Originally Passed in Section 59-5-102(5) 
Shows Legislative Intent That "Started" Refers to Drilling. 
When first passed, H.B. 110, contained a grandfather clause that exempted from 
tax "the first six months of production for wells started after January 1, 1984, but before 
January 1, 1990." See Enrolled Copy H.B. No. 110, Pg 6, Appendix I. The legislature 
removed the grandfather clause in 2004. See 2004 Utah Laws Ch. 244 (S.B. 191). The 
grandfather clause allowed taxpayers to continue to benefit from the previous occupation 
tax statute, Section 59-5-67, that exempted wells started after January 1, 1984. 
Summit argues the statute should be interpreted liberally and read to exempt "wells 
where commercial production started after January 1, 1990." See Petitioners Brief p. 22. 
Summit's proposed construction renders the grandfather clause meaningless. This Court 
has stated that interpretations should be avoided "that will render portions of a statute 
superfluous or inoperative." Hall v. State Dep't of Com. 2001 UT 34 f 15. If the 
Legislature had intended the statute to read "started commercial production after January 
1, 1990," there would have been no need for the grandfather clause. If wells had not 
"started commercial production" prior to January 1, 1990, they would be covered by the 
language as Summit would have the Court interpret it. There would be no purpose in 
looking back to a prior "started" date which occurred "after January 1,1984 but before 
January 1, 1990," since under Summit's interpretation, if it had not yet "started 
commercial production" it had not "started." 
Under Summit's reading, any well that had "started commercial production" after 
16 
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January 1, 1984, would have long since received the benefit of the prior exemption, there 
would be no need to "grandfather" them in. The grandfather only clause functions under 
the Commission's reading of the statute. A well could easily have been "started," that is 
drilled, after January 1, 1984, the cut off date for the original statute, and before January 
1, 1990, but had not produced during that period. Only the Commission's reading gives 
effect to the grandfather clause by allowing them to benefit from the prior exemption. 
Under Summit's reading, the clause is meaningless and unnecessary. The Legislature is 
not presumed to enact language which means nothing. The Commission's interpretation 
of the statute is correct and should be affirmed. 
4. Statutes and Case Law From Other States Consistently Link the 
Starting of a Well with Spudding. 
Finally, the Commission's construction is both reasonable and consistent with 
statutes and case law from other states. Alabama and Texas explicitly link spudding and 
the starting date of a well. Alabama provides that "a well shall be deemed to have 
commenced when the well is spudded" for severance tax purposes. Ala. Code 1975 § 40-
20-1(1985). Texas uses a similar standard, specifically the "initial penetration of the 
earth by the drill bit for an oil or gas well" is spudding that starts a well. V.T.C.A., Tax 
Code § 2004.001 (1993). Likewise, Courts have interpreted the term "started" have 
found a well is started when the drill bit pierces the earth, which is termed "spudded." 
See Allen v. Palmer. 209 P.2d 502, 504-05 (Okla. 1949), Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Northern. 
500 F.Supp 624, 626 (Wyo. 1980). 
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Petitioner cites two cases to support the proposition that the date a well is "started" 
differs by jurisdiction. Both cases involved private contracts. Any ambiguity in 
interpreting the contracts involved whether the parties contemplated activity that occurred 
before spudding. In Vickers v. Peaken the court ruled that a well can be started before 
the drill bit pierces the earth and referenced numerous pre-drilling events such as, 
surveying the location or construction of an access road, events that occur before 
spudding. Id, 300 S.W.2d 29, 32 (Ark. 1957). In another case, the court stated that 
"commence to drill" refers "to the first operations on the land preliminary to the actual 
drilling or spudding." Hilliard v. Franzeim. 180 So.2d 746, 747 (La. 1965). Again this 
refers to activity before spudding. Even if "started" can mean something other than 
"spudded" in a private contract,, it still is associated with activities that bring a well into 
being. 
Our Legislature does not operate in a vacuum. While other jurisdictions9 statutes 
and their courts' interpretation of them are not binding in interpreting what our 
Legislature has done, it should be presumed that our Legislature was aware of what other 
states had done on a given topic. By using the term started to create the exemption in 
question, the legislature gave no indication that it intended to depart from the ordinary, 
customary, and well-understood meaning that "starting" a well refers to starting to drill. 
The Tax Commission's use of this date to determine when the Well was started gives 
effect to the statute's plain ordinary meaning and all of its terms. 
18 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
CONCLUSION 
Petitioner seeks a liberal construction of the statute, one that requires redrafting of 
plain and unambiguous language. Summit's reading would render both the limiting 
language "starting after January 1, 1990;"'and the grandfather clause meaningless. 
By contrast, the Tax Commission gave the statutory term "started" its plain 
ordinary meaning: to begin, start, commence. It selected a specific time which is certain, 
unambiguous and recorded in documentary evidence applicable in all new wells, the date 
drilling began as evidenced when the drill bit pierced the earth or as known in the 
industry spudding or spud date. The Commission's interpretation is consistent with how 
other courts have determined the issue, it is consistent with how other legislatures have 
defined when a well is started, and it is consistent with the expressed intent of Utah's 
Legislature. The Commission's interpretation gives expression and meaning to all of the 
terms of the statute as enacted. 
While the Commission finds no ambiguity in the statute, any ambiguity which is 
found to exist should be resolved in favor of taxation and construed narrowly against 
application of the exemption. Parson Asphalt 617 P.2d at 398. The Commission's grant 
of Summary Judgment upholding the audit assessment was therefore correct and should 
be affirmed. 
DATED this 9^" day of September, 2011. 
\^X&Ji (/^ J^^J^O^^^ 
CLARK L.SNELSON 
Assistant Utah Attorney General 
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§6.2 THE OIL AND GAS LEASE—DURATION 261 
For the most part, it is somewhat misleading to label the lessee's 
interest as either a possessory or non-possessory interest in land. The 
nature of the lessee's interest in any particular jurisdiction will depend 
upon its treatment by the courts in connection with the statute of 
frauds; tax liability; dower and curtesy; actions concerning real prop-
erty such as ejectment; venue and jurisdiction of courts; joinder of 
parties; conveyancing statutes; homestead rights; creation and fore-
closure of vendor's, materialmen's and laborer's liens; real estate 
brokers' commissions and license; corporate franchise taxes on tangible 
property owned by the corporation, etc. Although these problems no 
longer pose pressing problems in most producing jurisdictions, having 
been settled by judicial decision or statute, in most of the states that 
consider the interest of the lessee to be basically a non-possessory 
interest, decisions concerning the precise nature of the interest in 
particular instances are far from consistent.36 
§ 6.2 Classification of Oil and Gas Leases by Duration 
Although early draftsmen were strongly influenced by leases used 
for hard mineral mining, a more flexible structure was evolved for use by 
the oil and gas lessee. 
The "drill or pay" lease allowed the lessor to hold the lessee liable for 
payment of delay rentals during the entire primary term, or to terminate 
the lease in the event of non-compliance by the lessee. 
The "unless" lease, however, became the most commonly used lease 
in the industry, as it allows the lessee freedom of action in either paying 
the delay rentals or of drilling, with the only result of non-compliance 
being the loss of the lease. 
As mentioned previously, draftsmen of early oil and gas leases were 
influenced by instruments pertaining to hard mineral mining. Essen-
tially, however, a different factor was present, although not immediate-
ly recognized: The nature of petroleum products as migratory sub-
stances. Where hard minerals were concerned, no problem was 
presented by the failure to remove such minerals for a long period of 
time, other than loss of immediate income from production. This, of 
course, is not the case where petroleum products, due to tardy develop-
ment, are being drained by production from adjacent lands. For this 
reason the fee conveyance or long-term lease were soon abandoned in 
order to gain flexibility in the event of a failure of the lessee to 
develop.37 
follows the West Virginia view, Morris v. 
Messer, 156 Term. 54, 299 S.W 782. 
36. See Summers, Oil and Gas Law, ch. 
7, Legal Interest Created by Oil and Gas 
Leases. 
§ 6.2 
37. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Southland Royalty 
Co., Tex., 496 S.W.2d 547 (an example of a 
lease with a 50-year fixed term that 
caused extensive litigation as the field was 
still highly productive at the end of the 50 
years!). 
In general see Summers, Oil and Gas 
Law, Volume 2, Chapter 11. Many early 
leases were conveyances for periods of 15 
to 99 years. Upon appreciation of the mi-
gratory nature of oil and gas, they were 
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The first form of lease to gain widespread popularity was the so-
called "or" lease form.38 Under this form of lease, land was leased for a 
fixed period of time, which initial period could be extended by produc-
tion. During each year of the initial period the lessee covenanted to 
either drill a well or pay a sum of money to the lessor to delay 
operations. Such sum is called a delay rental. It was held that the 
lessee had no right to terminate the lease, and the lessor could not force 
the lessee to drill a well, but could bring suit for the rentals.39 Since 
the lessee had no right to terminate, he either had to drill a well or was 
absolutely obligated to pay rentals during the entire term o£the lease. 
Later, a forfeiture clause was added by which the lessor could elect 
to terminate the lease upon failure of the lessee to drill. The lessee 
attempted to claim benefit of the clause where he had failed to drill, 
but it was held that the forfeiture clause was for the benefit of the 
lessor and not the lessee.40 Therefore, under this form of "or" lease the 
lessee was again obligated to either drill or pay, but the lessor could 
elect to sue for the rentals during the term of the lease, or could 
terminate the lease for failure of the lessee to do either. 
In an attempt to alleviate this situation a surrender clause was 
added to the lease, whereby the lessee could elect to surrender the lease 
and avoid further liability for rentals where he desired not to develop 
the land. However, some courts looked at the oil and gas lease as an 
executory contract. As it was customary for the lessee to pay only a 
very nominal consideration, with the lessor looking to development for 
return, courts looked at the lease containing a surrender clause as 
placing no obligation upon the lessee and held the lease to be invalid.41 
Although later cases have upheld such leases without the necessity of 
followed by leases covering small acreage 
containing short terms of several months 
in which the lessee must drill or forfeit. 
When deeper wells were necessary the les-
see needed a longer term within which he 
could block up larger acreage and acquire 
greater amounts of capital; hence leases 
with a fixed term of five or ten years were 
developed. See Shannon v. Long, 180 Ala. 
128, 60 So. 273; Karns v. Tanner, 66 Pa. 
297; J.M. Guffey Petroleum Co. v. Oliver, 
Tex.Civ.App., 79 S.W. 884. 
38. O'Hara v. Coltrin, Colo.App., 637 
P.2d 398; Carroll v. Eaton, 168 Mont. 150, 
541 P.2d 64; Norman Jessen & Associates, 
Inc. v. Amoco Production Co., N.D., 305 
N.W.2d 648; Cohn v. Clark, 48 Okl. 500, 
150 P. 467; Girolami v. Peoples Natural 
Gas Co., 365 Pa. 455, 76 A.2d 375; McEl-
roy, Unless vs. Or: An Appraisal, 6 Bay-
lor L.Rev. 415. 
39. Butler v. Nepple, 54 Cal.2d 589, 6 
Cal.Rptr. 767, 354 P.2d 239; Sugg v. 
Williams, 191 Ky. 188, 229 S.W. 72; Jack-
son v. Twin State Oil Co., 95 Okl. 96, 218 P. 
324. 
40. Galey v. Kellerman, 123 Pa. 491, 16 
A. 474; and see, Poe v. Ulrey, 233 111. 56, 
84 N.E. 46; Cohn v. Clark, 48 Okl. 500,150 
P. 467; Hickernell v. Gregory, Tex.Civ. 
App., 224 S.W. 691. 
41. Eclipse Oil Co. v. South Penn Oil 
Co., 47 W.Va. 84, 34 S.E. 923; Federal Oil 
Co. v. Western Oil Co., 7th Cir., 112 Fed. 
373, affirmed 121 Fed. 674. See Summers, 
Oil and Gas Law, Vol. 2, §§ 223-243 for a 
discussion of the variations in these early 
lease forms and the error of the early 
courts in holding that such leases were 
tenancies at will. Sidwell Oil & Gas Co., 
Inc. v. Loyd, 230 Kan. 77, 630 P.2d 1107 
(1981), is an example of mistaken creation 
of a no term lease, created by stating as 
the first delay rental payment date, the 
date that the three year primary term 
ended. Another common mistake that can 
create a no term lease, is where a lease is 
executed providing for a one year primary 
term. The parties do not strike the delay 
rental clause and provide for delay rentals 
with the first rental payment due on last 
day of the primary term. 
Also see footnote 39, supra. 
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payment of a substantial additional consideration for the surrender 
clause,42 it was this state of affairs that led the oil and gas industry to 
look for an alternative form of oil and gas lease. This was found in the 
"unless" type lease. 
The "unless" lease form is commonly referred to as the "Producer's 
88 Lease." This title resulted from the act of a Tulsa, Oklahoma 
printer who numbered his printed forms, and in printing an "unless" 
lease form designated it as number "88." Since landowners became 
willing to accept the 88 lease form, its use was encouraged by other 
printers who also called their "unless" form leases "Producer's 88" 
leases. An examination of lease forms in current use will reveal that 
they are still designated as "Producer's 88 Form Lease," or "Producer's 
88 Lease, Revised," which may or may not set forth the last date of 
revision.43 
With the increasing awareness of the landowner as to the subtleties 
of oil and gas law, no longer will printed forms with such a designation 
be naively accepted and executed by a landowner. However, many oil 
companies still print up such forms (or have them printed up) which 
contain provisions thought beneficial, for this is both cheaper and does 
not generate the suspicion that a typed lease still may do upon 
occasion. 
The form of the "unless" lease resembles the form of the "or" lease 
in many respects. Each contains a fixed term. The fixed term is 
referred to as the primary term of the lease. The primary term may be 
for any term of years that is agreeable to the parties. In recent years 
the primary term of the oil and gas lease in common use appears to 
have become shortened from the former customary term of ten years to 
five or three years. In areas of high activity, leases are routinely found 
with short terms of three months to a year. Many contain an obli-
gation well clause. Such short terms are favorable to the landowner, as 
they force the lessee to promptly begin to develop the property or lose 
the lease. 
The primary term of the "unless" lease is followed by a secondary 
term, which is indefinite in duration and is dependent upon production 
for continued existence. A similar secondary term is also provided for 
in the "or" lease form. 
It is in the structure of the primary term that the "unless" and the 
"or" form leases may be distinguished. As seen above, the lessee using 
42. Brown v. Wilson^.58 Okl. 392, 160 P. 
94 (It was this case that led attorneys in 
Tulsa, Oklahoma, to develop the "unless" 
form lease); Rich v. Doneghey, 71 Okl. 204, 
177 P. 86; Corsicana Petroleum Co. v. 
Owens, 110 Tex. 568, 222 S.W. 154. 
43. The designation is generally that of 
an "unless" form lease. As most printed 
forms of the Producer's 88 lease are prom-
ulgated by various oil and gas companies, 
the terms necessarily will differ according 
to the understanding of a particular com-
pany as to desirable provisions in the lease. 
For this reason the designation of a lease 
as a Producer's 88 is not legally descriptive 
of the estate or interest that it creates in 
the lessee. See Fagg v. Texas Co., Tex. 
Com.App., 57 S.W.2d 87, and Walker, De-
fects and Ambiguities in Oil and Gas Leas-
es, 28 Tex.L.Rev. 895; Veasey, The Law of 
Oil and Gas, 18 Mich.L.Rev. 652. 
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the "or" form lease is under an absolute obligation to drill or pay at the 
end of each year of the primary term. Upon failure to do either, the 
lessor has a right to terminate. This right of termination is in the 
nature of a forfeiture due to non-compliance with a condition subse-
quent. Such forfeiture is not automatic upon non-compliance, but must 
be judicially asserted by the lessor, and may be prevented by good cause 
shown by the lessee. 
On the other hand, the modern "unless" form lease expressly 
provides that the primary term shall terminate upon any anniversary 
date of the lease during its primary term, unless the lessee either pays 
the delay rental then due or commences the operations for the drilling 
of a well prior to each such date. Any year during the primary term 
when the lessee does not either commence operations or pay the delay 
rental he will lose his lease; however, there is no obligation upon him 
to do either act. As will be seen in later sections of this work, in most 
jurisdictions the termination of the "unless" lease for non-compliance is 
treated as a common law limitation upon the estate or interest of the 
lessee. The lease terminates automatically upon non-compliance. 
The "unless" form of oil and gas lease is in almost exclusive use in 
this country, as it has achieved the desired flexibility for the lessee 
without the resulting liability of the "or" lease form. However, some 
thought has been given in the oil industry to going back to a modified 
"or" form lease to escape some of the limitation features of the "unless" 
lease. 
§ 6,3 Keeping t h e Lease Alive During the Primary Term— 
The Delay Rental 
The delay rental provision allows the lessee to pay an annual rental 
in lieu of development for each year of the primary term. Under the 
customary "unless" lease a failure of the lessee to either commence a 
well or pay the delay rental on or prior to the anniversary date for each 
year of the lease within the primary term will result in termination of the 
lease. Such provision is properly construed as a common law limitation 
on the estate of the lessee. 
( Rex Oil Company executes an "unless" type oil and gas lease upon 
Blackacre with a ten-year primary term. As will be seen in later 
sections,44 Rex must have production in paying quantities or some 
contractual substitute such as shut-in royalty payments or development 
operations at the end of the primary term in order for the7 lease to be 
propelled into the secondary term. The failure of the^essee to be so 
producing or operating at the end of the primary term will result in the 
termination of the lease, either by its own terms or under a decree of 
cancellation, depending upon the jurisdiction the lessee is operating in. 
However, what must Rex Oil Company do to keep the lease alive during 
the ten-year primary term? 
§ 6.3 
44. See §§ 6.10 and 6.11, infra. 
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340 THE OIL AND GAS LEASE—DURATION Ch. 6 
drilling at the end of the primary term.291 Again, although well No. 2 
may be completed as a producer, the lease will terminate. 
§ 6.7 Propell ing the Lease Past the Primary Term by Op-
erations—Commencement of Drilling Operations 
In order to determine whether the activities of a lessee prior to the 
end of the primary term are sufficient to constitute the commencement of 
operations to drill a well, the courts will look to the financial and 
technological ability of the lessee and his subjective intent or good faith 
to diligently complete the well. When satisfied as to the above, a 
minimum of activities of the lessee on the drill site are sufficient to 
constitute the commencement of operations to drill a well, although 
spudding of the well has not occurred prior to the end of the primary 
term. 
Although contractual variations may be found,292 the vast majority 
of well completion clauses have a condition that the lessee must have 
commenced operations for the drilling of a well prior to the end of the 
primary term. Such operative language has been generally interpreted 
to mean that operations for the drilling of a well, and not the actual 
spudding in or drilling of the hole, must have commenced prior to the 
end of the primary term. 
Where the wording of the clause requires the lessee to start 
operations for the drilling of a well before the end of the primary term, 
obviously the actual "spudding in" of a well prior to the end of the 
primary term satisfies the clause.293 Where operations only are envi-
sioned prior to the end of the primary term, the parties have agreed 
that something less than spudding in will suffice. What acts of the 
291. Rogers v. Osborn, 152 Tex. 540, 
261 S.W.2d 311, noted 6 Bay.L.Rev. 106; 32 
Tex.L.Rev. 240; cf. Pardue v. Mark, Tex. 
Civ.App., 279 S.W.2d 594. Lease forms 
drafted after the Rogers case have been 
modified in many cases so that the well 
completion clause will apply to the well 
drilling at the end of the primary term or 
to any subsequent wells. 
§ 6.7 
292. Lewis v. Nance, 20 Cal.App.2d 71, 
66 P.2d 708, noted in 12 So.Calif.L.Rev. 96, 
where clause required lessee to start "the 
drilling of a well for oil * * * ", held to 
require actual drilling of the hole and not 
just preliminary operations; and see State 
ex rel. Commissioners of Land Office v. 
Carter Oil Co., Okl., 336 P.2d 1086, noted 
13 Okl.L.Rev. 82. It should be noted that 
the language in the delay rental clause 
calling for the commencement of a well 
before the next ensuing anniversary date 
of the primary term to suspend the necessi-
ty of paying the next delay rental, is sim-
ilar to language in the well completion 
clause. Generally speaking, the test of 
whether a lessee has "commenced" the op-
erations to drill a well is the same for 
either of the clauses. 
293. See Wehran v. Helis, La.App., 152 
So.2d 220. Here the lease provided opera-
tions would be considered as having com-
menced if materials were placed on the site 
prior to the end of the primary term. On 
the next to the last day the drilling barge 
and derrick became stuck in the canal. 
However, the well was spudded in the next 
day. Huhn v. Marshall Exploration, Inc., 
La.App., 337 So.2d 561 ("operations for 
drilling"). Murphy v. Amoco Production 
Company, 590 F.Supp. 455 (D.C.N.D.1984), 
example of activities of preparation for 
drilling short of spudding in that were 
sufficient. Cf. Sheffield v. Exxon Corpora-
tion, 424 So.2d 1297 (Ala. 1982) where activ-
ities of negotiation of sales contract, inter-
nal corporate authority to drill, which did 
not include physical acts on the land, were 
not sufficient. 
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CHAPTER 32 
DRILLING CLAUSE OF OIL AND GAS LEASE-
DISTINCTION BETWEEN "COMMENCEMENT" 
AND "COMPLETION" TYPES OF 
DRILLING CLAUSE 
SECTION 
32.1 Distinguishing characteristics of the "commencement" and "completion" 
types of drilling clauses. 
32.2 Variations in provisions in drilling clauses requiring commencement of a 
well. 
32.3 What constitutes "commencement" of a well under drilling clause. 
(a) General test for determining "commencement" of a well. 
(b) Acts constituting "commencement" of a well. 
(c) Good faith as a factor in "commencement" of a well. 
(d) Diligence in continuing drilling operation as a factor in "commence-
ment" of a well. 
32.4 What constitutes "completion" of a well under drilling clause. 
§ 32.1 Distinguishing characteristics of the "commencement" and 
"completion" types of drilling clauses. 
In addition to the classification of drilling clauses as "unless" and 
"or" types,1 drilling clauses may also be classified as "commencement" 
or "completion" types.2 Such distinction is a simple one and is based 
upon the performance required of the lessee to prevent a termination of 
the lease, or as an alternative to the payment of delay rentals. Thus, the 
primary significance of the distinction between "commencement" and 
"completion" types of drilling clauses relates primarily to the determina-
tion of whether or not the lessee has complied with the requirements of 
the drilling clause. Such distinction is also significant, however, for the 
purposes of determining whether or not the lessee who has commenced 
a well within the primary term has the privilege of completing such well 
after the expiration of the primary term. The latter subject is discussed 
in connection with the discussion of the habendum clause.3 
i See Chap. 29. 1958), 336 P(2d) 1086, 10 O&GR 790; 
2 See Haddock v. McClendon, 223 Ark Moncrief v, Pasotex Pet. Co. (10th Cir 
396, 266 SW(2d) 74, 3 O&GR 1219 1960), 280 F(2d) 235, 12 O&GR 1087; cert 
(1954); Commissioners of Land Office v. denied, 364 US 912, 13 O&GR 622 (1960). 
Carter Oil Co. of W. Va. (OklaSupCt 3 See § 26.13. 
6? 
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§32.2 THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS 68 
Ely the terms of the "commencement" type of drilling clause, the 
lessee must commence a well on or before a specified date. Such provi-
sion may appear in either the "unless" or the "or" type of drilling clause. 
By the terms of the "completion" type of drilling clause, the lessee must 
complete a well on or before a certain date. Such provision may also 
appear in either the "unless" or "or" type of drilling clause. 
It is also possible for the drilling clause or other provision in the lease 
to contain provisions which give the drilling clause the characteristics of 
both the "commencement" and the "completion" type. In such in-
stances, the drilling clause will require commencement of a well on or 
before a specific date and then contain a further provision that it must 
be completed on or before a later date.4 
If the lease requires both commencement and completion of a well, 
the forfeiture provision will apply to both events independently; and a 
waiver or extension of time for the commencement of the well does not 
operate as an extension of time for completion.5 
Primarily, the problems which have been litigated with respect to 
the "commencement" and the "completion" types of drilling clauses in-
volve the determination of whether or not a well has been commenced 
in compliance with a "commencement" type drilling clause,6 or whether 
or not a well has been completed in compliance with a "completion" 
type drilling clause.7 
§ 32.2 Variations in provisions in drilling clauses requiring com-
mencement of a well. 
The most simple form of drilling clause which requires commence-
ment of a well, whether it appears in an "unless" type of drilling clause,1 
or in an "or" type of drilling clause,2 makes reference to a "well" as the 
thing to be commenced. There is considerable authority with respect to 
what constitutes "commencement of a well," or "commencement of op-
erations for the drilling of a well," or what constitutes performance 
where the provision does not specifically provide that actual drilling be 
« See, e.g., Sugg v. Williams, 191 Ky • i See § 29.2 for a typical "unless" type 
188, 229 SW 72 (1921); Cleminger v. Ba- of drilling clause which is also a "com-
den Gas Co., 159 Pa 16, 28 Atl 293 (1893); mencement" type. 
Frost v. Martin (TexCivApp 1918), 203 SW 2 See § 29.3 for a typical "or" type of 
72. drilling clause which is also a "commence-
* Cleminger v. Baden Gas Co., 159 Pa ment" type. 
16, 28 Atl 293 (1893). 
4 See § 32.3. 
7 See § 32.4. 
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69 DISTINCTION BETWEEN "COMMENCEMENT" AND "COMPLETION" ETC § 32.2 
commenced. In such instances, it is generally held that operations pre-
paratory to drilling are sufficient and that it is not necessary that the 
lessee be in the process of making hole at the prescribed time.3 
It is possible, however, for the parties to use language in the lease or 
other related instrument which requires that the lessee must have done 
something more than make preparations for drilling. In such instance, 
the language may be construed to mean that the lessee must have pene-
trated the surface of the land and must be in the process of making hole 
at the specified time. Such language may appear in the drilling clause, 
in some other clause of the lease relating to continuous drilling opera-
tions, or in an escrow agreement or other contract which controls the 
rights of the parties. Examples of various provisions which have been 
used to describe the thing to be commenced and which appear to re-
quire the lessee to do more than make preparations for making hole 
include: "commence drilling operations,"4 "commence to drill a well,"5 
"start the drilling of a well,"6 "commence the actual drilling of a well,"7 
"begin actual work of drilling,"8 "commence drilling operations,"9 "ac-
tual work in connection with the drilling of such well shall be com-
menced,"10 and "commence to drill."11 
In those cases where the language contained in a drilling clause, 
continuous drilling clause, or clause in an escrow agreement or related 
contract, is such that it is capable of being construed to require more 
than preparatory work on the part of the lessee, the construction placed 
upon such language has not been uniform. In some instances, the court 
has found a distinction between clauses which call for "commencement 
of a well" or "commencement of operations for the drilling of a well" 
3 See §32.3. 8 See Moore v. West (TexCivApp 1922), 
4 See Haddock v. McClendon, 223 Ark 239 SW 710 (in drilling clause of lease 
396, 266 SW(2d) 74, 3 O&GR 1219 (1954) with similar clause in a related bond). 
(in continuous drilling clause); Fast v. » Wooton v. McAdoo, 110 CalApp 48, 
Whitney, 26 Wyo 433, 187 Pac 192 (1920) 293 Pac 694 (1930) (in part of drilling 
(drilling clause referred to commencement clause relating to a second well). 
of a "well" and also to commencement of 10 See Robinson v. Gordon Oil Co., 258 
"drilling operations") Mich 643, 242 NW 795 (1932), superseded 
s See Smith v. Gypsy Oil Co., 130 Okla on another question, 266 Mich 65, 253 
135, 265 Pac 647 (1928) (in drilling clause NW 218 (1934) (in escrow agreement). See 
of lease). also Hughes v. Ford, 406 111 171, 92 
6 See Lewis v. Nance, 20 CalApp(2d) NE(2d) 747 (1950) (language in escrow 
71, 66 P(2d) 708 (1937) (in drilling clause agreement influenced construction of lan-
of lease). guage in lease). 
7 See Gilliland v. Kimbrough (Tex- " See Terry v. Texas Co. (TexCivApp 
CivApp 1940), 146 SW(2d) 1101 (alleged 1920), 228 SW 1019 (in drilling clause). 
to be contained in a contract for delivery 
of lease). 
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§32.2 THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS 70 
and which call for "commencement of drilling operations," or which 
otherwise make specific reference to drilling. When such distinction is 
drawn, activity on the part of the lessee preparatory to making hole will 
not satisfy a clause which requires the commencement of drilling. Under 
such a construction of the instrument, the lessee must have penetrated 
the surface of the land and must be in the process of making hole.12 
On the other hand, there are other instances where the court has 
pointed out that there is no reasonable distinction to be drawn between 
"commencing operations" and "commencing drilling operations,"13 or 
has held that preparatory activity is sufficient under a provision which 
requires the lessee to "commence to drill a well," or contains similar 
language with specific reference to drilling.14 
The difference of opinion with respect to whether or not preparatory 
acts will satisfy the drilling requirement under various terms used is not 
a simple division of authority as to the proper construction to be placed 
upon the language which describes the thing to be commenced. Actu-
ally, there are at least three points of view which must be considered. 
According to the first point of view, emphasis is placed upon the 
language which describes the thing to be commenced, and if "drilling" 
is the thing to be commenced, the lessee must be in the process of mak-
ing hole. 
According to the second point of view, the same emphasis is placed 
upon the language which describes the thing to be commenced, but 
unless the language is very explicit, a requirement to commence "drill-
ing" will be construed to mean the same thing as a requirement to com-
mence "operations." 
According to the third point of view, emphasis is not placed upon the 
language which describes the thing to be commenced, but emphasis is 
placed upon the meaning of the term "commence." Under this point of 
view, regardless of the language which is used to descriBe^thelhing to be 
12 Wooton v. McAdoo, 110 CalApp 48, Pac 192 (1920). See Walton v. Zatkoff, 372 
293 Pac 694 (1930); Lewis v. Nance, 20 Mich 491, 127 NW(2d) 365, 20 O&GR 582 
CalApp(2d) 71, 66 P(2d) 708 (1937); (1964). 
Hughes v.Ford, 406 111 171, 92 NE(2d) 747 u Haddock v. McClendon, 223 Ark 
(1950); Solbergv. Sunburst Oil & Gas Co., 396, 266 SW(2d) 74, 3 O&GR 1219 
73 Mont 94, 235 Pac 761 (1925); [see also (1954); Smith v. Gypsy Oil Co., 130 Okla 
Solberg v. Sunburst Oil & Gas Co., 76 135, 265 Pac 647 (1928); Jones v. Moore 
Mont 254, 246 Pac 168 (1926)]; Moore v. (OklaSupCt 1959), 338 P(2d) 872, 10 
West (TexCivApp 1922), 239 SW 710; Gil- O&GR 963; Terry v. Texas Co. (Tex-
liland v. Himbrough (TexCivApp 1940), CivApp 1920), 228 SW 1019; Whelan v. R. 
146 SW(2d) 1101. Lacy, Inc. (TexCivApp 1952), 251 SW(2d) 
13 Fast v. Whitney, 26 Wyo 433, 187 175, 1 O&GR 1867. 
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71 DISTINCTION BETWEEN "COMMENCEMENT" AND "COMPLETION" ETC. § 32.2 
commenced, such lgnflnagp is oonsrrnfid as dpsnrjbing the end result. 
Consequently^ any preparatory act leading to such end result constitutes 
a "commencement^ 
The first point of view, which is the most restrictive, is well illus-
trated by a Montana case. In such case, the court pointed out that the 
language of the instrument will govern its interpretation if clear and 
explicit and that an oil and gas lease is construed against the lessee. The 
court resorted to Webster's definitions of the terms "commence," "drill," 
"drilling," and "operation," and stated its conclusions in the following 
language: 
"Applying these definitions and rules of construction, we have no 
doubt as to the proper meaning to be placed on the language used. 
We are of the opinion that the words 'commence drilling operations' 
denote unmistakably f ^ t\r*\ movement of the drill in penetrating 
I-^P gyniinri. We think that the contracting parties had in mind the 
'spudding in' of a well as the terms are generally understood in the 
parlance of those engaged in the exploration and development of oil. 
"Authorities cited by the defendant, interpreting language used 
in such contracts, in effect that the lessee shall 'commence operations 
for the drilling of a well for oil,' or 'commence operations for a test 
well,' or 'shall commence operations,' within a specified time, have 
no application. In such instances it has been held that work done 
preliminary to actual drilling constitutes a sufficient compliance 
with the contract. . . . 
"A requirement that the lessee shall 'commence operations' 
within a given time is entirely different from one obligating him to 
'commence drilling pppraHnns for ojl' As to the proper construction 
to be placed on the words 'shall commence operations,' we do not 
find ourselves at variance with the decisions of other courts gener-
ally, and believe that such a contract is usually satisfied by prelimi-
nary work necessary to actual drilling. However, clear distinction 
exists and must be recognized between such language employed in a 
contract, and that which was used in the contract before us. 
"The case of Fast v. Whitney, 26 Wyo. 433, 187 P. 192, cited and 
relied upon by the defendant, and that of Terry v. Texas Co. (Tex. 
Civ. App.), 228 S.W. 1019, are authority for the position taken by 
the defense, that the words used in the contract, viz., 'commence 
drilling operations,' are satisfied where the lessee has erected a der-
rick or engaged in other necessary preliminary work to actual drill-
ing. These cases are ill considered and treat the words 'drilling oper-
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ations' as no different than if the contract merely required 'the 
commencement of operations' within a specified time. A clear dis-
tinction in the meaning of these terms is quite apparent/'15 
The second point of view, which is less restrictive than the point of 
view just described, is well illustrated by a Wyoming case. In such case, 
the court described the more liberal view and revealed its reasoning in 
the following statement: 
"Referring to certain cases cited by the appellants, and contending 
that they hold only that acts similar to those alleged in the petition 
are sufficient to constitute the commencement of 'operations' under 
an oil and gas lease, and conceding the correctness of the conclusion 
of the court in those cases, counsel for respondents maintain that 
there is a clear distinction between commencing 'operations' and 
commencing 'drilling operations' or 'the drilling of a well.' 
"We are inclined to doubt there being any reasonable distinction 
between commencing 'operations' and commencing 'drilling opera-
tions' under a provision in an oil lease for commencing work within 
a specified time, using either of those terms to describe the work to 
be commenced. Ordinarily, at least a provision in such a lease for 
commencing operations would seem necessarily to refer to opera-
tions for drilling a well, or, in other words, drilling operations."16 
The third point of view is the most liberal and places emphasis upon 
construction of the term "commence" rather than upon the language 
describing the thing to be commenced. Under such point of view, it is 
not particularly material whether the thing to be commenced is "drill-
ing," "drilling operations," or "operations for drilling," because the same 
preparatory steps are required in the commencement of any such opera-
tions. Illustrations of the third point of view are provided by cases from 
Michigan, California, and Arkansas. 
In the Michigan case, the lease required that "actual work in con-^ 
nection with the drilling of such well shall be commenced." After re-
viewing many cases, the court said: 
"The theory of these cases is that the work done in preparation 
for drilling a well is a necessary part of drilling. So in the instant 
case, assuming but not holding that the lease required the plaintiff 
I* Solberg v. Sunburst Oil & Gas Co., '* Fast v. Whitney, 26 Wyo 433, 187 
73 Mont 94, 235 Pac 761, 763 (1925). Pac 192, 195 (1920). 
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73 DISTINCTION BETWEEN "COMMENCEMENT" AND "COMPLETION" ETC. § 32.2 
to begin drilling on or before December 1, 1930, he satisfied that_ 
requirement of the lease in the preparations he made for drilling. 
Thpy y/ftnR a necessary pari-of-the. drilling"17 
In the California case, the lessee was required to commence "drilling 
operations," and the term "drilling operations" was defined in the lease 
as follows: " 'Drilling Operations,' as used in this lease, is defined to 
mean placing of material upon the premises for the construction of a 
derrick and other necessary structures for the drilling of an oil or gas 
well followed diligently by the construction of such derrick and other 
structures and by the actual operation of drilling in the ground." In 
determining whether or not preparatory acts were sufficient, the court 
observed that the definition of "drilling operations" in the lease was a 
definition of the completed operation, and that the word "commence" is 
properly defined to mean the first act toward drilling." 
In the Arkansas case, an assignment of a lease required that the 
assignee "commence the drilling of a well." The court concluded that it 
was not necessary that the drill bit pierce the earth on or before the 
critical date." In so holding the court stated: 
"Does 'drilling' commence with operations for a well, or does it com-
mence"only with the piercing of the ground with the drill-bit£-Dqes 
•haking a cake' begin wirh the preparation of the dough, or only 
with the actual placing of the dough in the oven?" 
It is, of course, possible to provide in an oil and gas lease that the 
lessee must have penetrated the surface of the land on or before a speci-
fied date. A common expression which is used to describe the first pene-
tration of the surface is "spudding in." A provision to the effect that the 
lessee must have "spudded in" on or before a certain date should be 
sufficiently specific to require an actual penetration of the surface in the 
act of drilling.,0 
It is also possible to define "commencement" specifically in the lease. 
" Robinson v. Gordon Oil Co., 258 » See Scheel v. Harr, 27 CalApp(2d) 
Mich 643, 242 NW 795, 796 (1932); super- 245, 80 P(2d) 1035 (1938); Werhan y. Helis 
seded on another question, 266 Mich 65, (LaApp 1963), 152 S2d 220, 19 O&GR 
253 NW 218 (1934). See Walton v. Zatkoff, 21; writ den., 153 S(2d) 882, 19 O&GR 
372 Mich 491, 127 NW(2d) 365, 20 O&GR 35. See also OUnkraft Inc. w Geraud 
582 (1964) (LaApp 1978), 364 S(2d) 639, 63 O&GR 
» Wilcox v. West, 45 CalApp(2d) 267, 165, wherein "spud in" was defined as 
114 P(2d) 39 (1941). used in gas purchase contract. 
» Vickers v. Peaker, 227 Ark 587, 300 
SW(2d) 29, 7 O&GR 1177 (1957). 
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In one instance, the lease provided: "operations hereunder shall be 
deemed commenced when the first material is placed on the ground," 
and the court was of the opinion that operations had not commenced 
although a dredge had been working over the location in preparation for 
the drilling barge.21 
§ 32.3 What constitutes "commencement" of a well under drilling 
clause-1 
(a) General test for determining "commencement" of a well. 
There have been innumerable cases which involve an infinite variety 
of facts and circumstances in which the court has been called upon to 
determine whethei^or not a well has been commenced under the_pj£fta-
ticms of thp Hrillvnp- c l a n g o r unrfcr the provisions of a related Hanse jn 
the oil and gas lease which requires that a well be commenced. In all of 
such cases, the ultimate fact to be determined was whether or not a well 
had been commenced, but because of the facts and circumstances in-
volved, the primary inquiry was directed toward some factor or combi-
nation of factors which tended to establish that the well had or had not 
been commenced. 
The factors which have been considered in determining whether or 
not a well had been commenced inolndeL±he_iartnrs of- fa)._acts on the 
premises, (b) good faith pf the lp,ssffi, flnd (r) Hi1igpnr^n_ mpt inn ing 
drilling operations. Such factors are obviously not isolated factors, and 
they are not separate things which require separate fact findings. The 
circumstances may be such that any one or more of the factors are re-
moved from consideration. 
Thus, ifji lessee completes a drilling operation and does so without 
undue interruption of activity, there is no occasion to make inquiry into 
anyTactor other than whether or not the acts on the premises were 
sufficient to constitute a commencement. On the other hand, if the les-
see ceases preliminary operations without penetrating the surface or 
without completing the drilling operation, then it is necessary to con-
sider what the objective was in starting the preparatory activity. In this 
instance, it is necessary to inquire into the good faith in starting the 
operation and the diligence in continuing it in order to determine 
whether or not the physical conduct constituted the commencement of a 
well. If the lessee had no intention of completing a well, the preliminary 
work was not the commencement of a well as the final product; it would 
2i Werhan v. Helis (LaApp 1963), 152 
S(2d) 220, 19 O&GR 21; writ den., 153 
S(2d) 882, 19 O&GR 35. 
i See Moses, "What Constitutes Com-
mencement of Operations under an Oil, 
Gas and Mineral Lease," 16 TulLRev 573 
(1942). 
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152 THE OIL AND GAS LEASE Ch. 2 
must be treated as ordinary income. From the lessee's perspective, 
payments for rights of way must be capitalized as basis in the interest 
acquired and then either amortized over their life or as part of the life of 
the reservoir. Oil companies usually deduct damage payments as ordi-
nary and necessary business expenses. 
C. HABENDUM CLAUSE: MAINTAINING THE 
LEASE DURING THE PRIMARY TERM 
" The habendum or term clause of an oil and gas lease sets the lease's 
duration.! Typically, modern term clauses provide for a primary term and 
a secondary term. The primarijerm of an oil and gas lease is a fixed 
term of years during which the lessee has the right, without__any 
obligation, to explore for oil and gas or to drill for oil and gas on the 
premises. The secondary term is the extended period for which r i^ ts j i re 
granted to^the lessee, subject to production being obtained. A common 
formulation of an habendum clause is: 
s* This lease shall be for a term of years from this date, called 
"primary term," and as long thereafter as oil or gas is produced 
* * * 
The lease habendum clause addresses the two fundamental goals sought 
by lessees in oil and gas leases. The primary term is TEeTbpEon period 
during which the lessee may explore the premises, and the secondary 
term protects the lessee By^  allowing it to Hold the leased premises 
indefinitely, so long as production continues. 
The primary term of an oil and gas lease, which is the subject of this 
section, sets the maximum period for which the lessee can maintain the 
lease rights without drilling upon the property. The length of the 
primary term is determined by the bargaining leverage of the parties and 
the amount of the bonus that the lessee is willing to pay. Except in 
Louisiana and Tennessee, where it may not exceed ten years, the term 
may be as long or as short as the parties agree. Ten years was once a 
common primary term, and it is still frequently the primary term of 
leases in unproven or marginally producing areas. Primary terms of from 
one to five years are more typical in states with established oil and gas 
production. 
1. MAINTAINING THE LEASE BY PAYING DELAY RENTALS 
Though the typical oil and gas lease does not expressly obligate the 
lessee to drill wells, there are several circumstances in which the lessee 
may have an implied duty to drill. Historically, one such duty has been 
commonly labeled the implied covenant to drill a test well. Early in the 
history of the oil and gas industry, the courts recognized an implied 
covenant to test the leased premises by drilling a well within a reason-
able time after a lease was acquired. Their theory was that royalties 
were the primary consideration for the grant of the lease and that there 
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PARTS OF'SPEECH 
i government contract to embalmjjead 
imited his embalming practice to the 
lough to pay his fee of $100. 
vas not to be embalmed. 
J 
s, describes or limits—verbs, ad-
sentences. 
l ly. [Carefully modifies verb, plan.] 
e v e r y important v i tamins. [Very 
'h ly salted. [Too modifies adverb, 
ing that salt can be harmful. [For-
ltence.] 
cognize because they are formed 
loudly, normally, happily. Still, 
\y, lovely, and silly, for example. 
-ly: very, much, always, not, yes-
ia tdo not. For a complete expla-
een adverbs and adjectives, see 
r
 by creating logical connections 
auses°. 
WmM&^^ 
V^Ofrt^yO^^ft.^'i/'/vi' y' _4 
I g l g g i ^ f l ^ n e 
sl^i^®ftSS^ 
^^&^t§SS 
fi^w%iflik'' ' 
'therefore, thi 
^xtyithen/m 
ffingllyffsubsi 
t^^mk 
RECOGNIZING PREPOSITIONS gr 
Descriptive adverbs can show levels of intensity, usually by 
adding more (or less) and most (or least): more happily, least clearly. 
WHERE TO FIND INFORMATION RELATED TO ADVERBS 
Well and good 
Badly and bad 
Punctuation with conjunctive adverbs 
EXERCISE 4 
Underline all adverbs. 
EXAMPLE Niagara Falls is eroding rapidly. 
12d 
12d 
24f, 25c 
1. The falls are already 12,000 years old. 
2. Erosion has steadily destroyed seven miles of land. 
3. Not less than one foot of land disappears annually. 
4. In aboutJ35,000 years, the falls wil l likely^merge with Lake Erie, which is 
novyjtwenty miles away. 
5. RecejnjJj^the rate of erosion has diminished very slightly^ as water has 
Been diverted to hydroelectric plants. *"~*~ 
6g 
Recognize prepositions. 
Prepositions function with other words, in prepositional 
phrases. A prepositional phrase always has a preposition and a 
noun or pronoun object. It may contain modifying words too. Prep-
ositional phrases often set out relationships in time or space: in 
April, under the orange umbrella. 
In the fall, we will hear a concert by our favorite tenor. 
WHERE TO FIND INFORMATION RELATED TO PREPOSITIONS 
Using pronouns as objects: me, him, whom, etc. 9b-9h 
Recognizing and revising sentence-fragment phrases 13 
Placing phrases carefully 15b, 15c 
Punctuating introductory phrases 24b 
Punctuating nonrestrictive phrases 24e 
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PARTS OF SPEECH gr 
C O M M O N PREPOSITIONS 
about 
above 
according to 
across 
after 
against 
along 
along with 
among 
apart from 
around 
as 
as for 
at 
because of 
before 
behind 
below 
beneath 
beside 
between 
beyond 
but 
by 
by means of 
EXERCISE 5 
Circle the prepositions and underline the prepositional phrases. 
EXAMPLE Much(of)New York City's famous skyline was built (by)Mohawk 
Indians. 
1. The first major construction job to employ Mohawks was a bridge across 
the St. Lawrence River in Canada. '"""*"""" 
2. Because Mohawks from t h e X a u g h j ? - § w 3 E ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ' ' 0 ^ w o r ' < e c ' ski' 'fully, at... 
jgreat heights, buildersjn the area hired them focjdd|t[qnal projects. 
3. They did their most famous work du j in^^ 
^ o o m of the 1920s and 1930s. """*"'" 
4. They traveled by subway from their homes in Brooklyn to w q r i ^ n j h e 
EmpXce_SMe._iiuiJd.ing and Rockefeller Cen te r^ 
5. Probably thousands of Mohawks have worked on projects in many North 
American cities over the years^ 
150 
concerning 
despite 
down 
during 
except 
except for 
excepting 
for 
from 
in 
in addition to 
in back of 
in case of 
in front of 
in place of 
inside 
in spite of 
instead of 
into 
like 
near 
next 
of 
off 
on 
onto 
on top of 
out 
out of 
outside 
over 
past 
regarding 
round 
since 
through 
throughout 
till 
to 
toward 
under 
underneath 
unlike 
until 
up 
upon 
up to 
with 
within 
without 
RECOGNIZING CONJUNCTIONS 
I 
•II 6h 
Recognize conjunctions. 
A conjunction connects won 
nating conjunctions join two or 
structures. 
4 
COORDINATING CONJUNCTIONS 
and nor so 
but or yet x 
for 
And, but, and or can join structure 
pronouns, verbs, adjectives, adverK 
dinating conjunction, yet can do th 
Oregon and Washington are 
We hike and camp there evei 
The air is fresh and clean, [a 
I love the outdoors, and m 
clauses] 
As coordinating conjunctions, for 
dent clauses. 
My vacation is in May, so w 
dent clauses] 
We will take warm clothic 
[ independent clauses] 
Correlative conjunctions 
lent grammatical structures. 
{ CORRELATIVE CONJUNCTIONS both . . . and 
either . . . or 
neither . . . nor 
not only . . . but (also) 
whether . . . or 
Both English and Spanish 
United States. 
Subordinating conjuncti 
verb) clauses0. 
4 
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STRUCTURES OF THE SENTENCE 
^mm^^^t'd'^y '"•'' #^ty&&£Fm'. 
WlKSS^F 
mm^mm 
Ifm^mmr 
• • 'o^f.v^;^v. 
' 3 ^ § ^ 
m expe r t , h e r l a w p ro fessor . [Her law 
oun expert.] 
word or group of words is an adjective, ad-
7 of the H.MS. Bounty (appositive), was in-
ee (adjective) mutinies. 
Fletcher Christian Jo.dk command and set 
men adrift in an ^ 5 e h boat. Bligh sailed 
:ulously6 arriving safely7 in the East Indies. 
r of the H.M.S. Director,8 was involved in 
The Nore, England. While governorpf New 
)ok some, unpopular measures, putiishing 
alesw InWe" actions set off the Rum Re-
Id in custody by mutineers. 
•elated words that does not contain a 
se cannot stand alone as an indepen-
parts of speech, 
s as a noun in a sentence. 
census dates back to the seventeenth 
as a verb in a sentence. 
mentioned in the Bible. 
RECOGNIZING PHRASES gr 
The Romans had been conducting censuses every five years to 
establish tax liabilities. 
A prepositional phrase, which always starts with a preposi-
tion, functions as an adjective or an adverb. 
After the collapse of Rome, the practice was discontinued until 
modern times. 
William the Conqueror conducted a census of landowners in 
newly conquered England in 1086. [three prepositional 
phrases in a row] 
An absolute phrase consists of a subject and a participle0. It 
functions as a modifier of the entire sentence to which it is at-
tached. 
Census-taking being the fashion, Quebec and Nova Scotia took 
sixteen counts between 1665 and 1754. 
Eighteenth-century Sweden and Denmark had complete records 
of their populations, each adult and child having been ac-
counted for. 
EXERCISE 6 
Identify whether each italicized word or group of words is a noun phrase, 
verb phrase, prepositional phrase, or absolute phrase. 
PREPOSITIONAL PRHASE 
EXAMPLE In animals, eighty to ninety percent of the food digested 
VERB PHRASE 
is used to supply energy. 
i, 5 .. . f.J^ > 
</% Many specific organic and inorganic substances are necessary for t n f 
growth and maintenance* of tilt bo§y.3 Nutritional peeds^yary from species 
to species, but the same^gef^ral principles4, apply ^ a f h i i s e s . 5 Body 
constantly being rebuilt,6 proteins, vitamins, and minerals are^mways 
needed.7 The average adult human requires only 45 to 6(1grams, 1V2 to 2 / 1 ^ 
ounces,9 of protein10 daily,. Protein is wjbkefi down" during diction*2 into ^f 
its aminb^8tis,u which aretiseu14 by fie b0/15 to provide theViourishment 
it needs. 
A verbal phrase is a word group that contains a verbal. Ver-
bals are infinitives0, past participles0, and present participles0. Ger-
und phrases function as nouns. A gerund is the -ing form of a 
verb—its present participle. Infinitive phrases function as nouns 
or modifiers. An infinitive is the simple form0 of a verb, usually 
preceded by to, but not always. 
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THE COMMA 
ive attempted to find common 
rol. 
or run experiments to provide 
irds pursue different goals and 
I . 
t one part pollutant per million 
one minute in two years one 
•vera lifetime. 
fering from diseases related to 
umbers than ever before. 
5,000 birds suffering from ill-
riose found in humans exposed 
Dmbat pollution because they 
Dlying that too few people are 
e human race faces a serious 
ordinate adject ives . 
> or more adjectives that 
Separate coordinate adjec-
mctions. 
mpatiently for the concert to 
in be inserted between them 
ut changing the meaning of 
when the example sentence 
ss, large crowd. Ill COMMA 
r a final coordinate adjective 
comma comes between rest-
(2) Don't put a comma be-
e. Ill . 
)ands. 
SETTING OFF NONRESTRICTIVE ELEMENTS 
EXERCISE 6 
Insert commas to separate coordinate adjectives. If a sentence needs no com-
mas, circle its number. 
EXAMPLE A lively bright chimpanzee named Kanzi can communicate with 
humans. 
A lively, bright chimpanzee named Kami can communicate with 
humans. 
1. Kanzi communicates using a keyboard filled with complex geometric 
symbols. 
2. Kanzi was not taught how to use the sophisticated intricate system. 
3. The bright curious young chimp quickly and efficiently learned on his 
own by watching his mother being taught. 
4. Kanzi has the most advanced linguistic abilities of any animal on record. 
5. Kanzi sometimes can be an exasperating stubborn student who teases his 
teachers by doing exactly the opposite of what is asked. 
6. He is not above giving his infant half-sister a sharp startling pinch if she 
is getting too much attention. 
7. Most of the time, however, Kanzi is a cheerful alert spirited student with 
remarkable unending desire to learn. 
•Il24e 
U s e c o m m a s to set off nonrestr ict ive (nonessential ) 
e l ements . Don't set off restrict ive (essential) 
e l ements . 
Restrictive and nonrestrictive elements are modifiers0. A non-
restrictive element is also called a nonessential element because 
the information it provides about the modified term is "extra." Al-
though the extra information adds texture to the meaning, if a non-
restrictive element is dropped, a reader will still understand the full 
meaning of the modified term. Nonrestrictive elements are set off 
with commas. 
| | p $ [ f ^ 
ivJ1 
T < 
1 
ft w 
I 
N 
^ 
i 
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THE COMMA 
An eighteenth-century Englishman, Thomas Sedall grew the 
largest potato on record. [The nonrestrictive phrase An eigh-
teenth-century Englishman adds information about Thomas 
Sedall, but the information is not essential for a reader to under-
stand which Thomas Sedall is meant.] 
Sedall dug the potato, which weighed 18.25 pounds, from his gar-
den in 1795. [The reader can understand what potato is meant 
without the information about weight in the nonrestrictive 
clause.] 
We can only imagine the reactions of his neighbors, who had 
never seen so large a potato. 
When the nonrestrictive information in these examples is elimi-
nated, the meaning of the modified terms does not change. 
Thomas Sedall grew the largest potato on record. 
Sedall dug the potato from his garden in 1795. 
We can only imagine the reactions of his neighbors. 
A restrictive element is essential to meaning. Notice what 
happens to the sentence Sedall dug the potato, which weighed 18.25 
pounds, from his garden in 1795 when we change the potato to a 
potato and which to that: 
Sedall dug a potato that weighed 18.25 pounds from his garden in 
1795. 
In this sentence, the clause about weight specifies exactly which 
potato is meant of all the potatoes in the garden: the one weighing 
18.25 pounds. The clause that weighed 18.25 pounds restricts the 
meaning of potato to one particular potato; it is essential to the 
meaning of potato. The clause is restrictive. 
Ill COMMA CAUTION: A restrictive element is essential, not extra. 
Don't set it off from the rest of the sentence. Ill 
Scientists who study food production experiment with many 
different growing conditions. [The noun scientists is limited by the 
restrictive element to only those scientists who study food pro-
duction.] 
Food grown in the laboratory is sometimes chemically produced 
without soil or water. [The noun food is limited to include only 
that grown in the laboratory.] 
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THE COMMA 
m a n , Thomas Sedall grew the 
nonrestrictive phrase An eigh-
ds information about Thomas 
>t essential for a reader to under-
sant.] 
[ghed 18.25 pounds, f rom his gar-
mderstand what potato is meant 
it weight in the nonrestrictive 
tions of his neighbors, who had 
Dn in these examples is elimi-
terms does not change. 
potato on record. 
arden in 1795. 
>ns of his neighbors. 
mtial to meaning. Notice what 
the potato, which weighed 18.25 
/hen we change the potato to a 
i 18.25 pounds from his garden in 
weight specifies exactly which 
in the garden: the one weighing 
%hed 18.25 pounds restricts the 
ir potato; it is essential to the 
jtrictive. 
3 element is essential, not extra, 
sentence. Ill 
o d u c t i o n experiment w i t h many 
le noun scientists is l imited by the 
>e scientists who study food pro-
is sometimes chemical ly produced 
in food is l imited to include only 
SETTING OFF NONRESTRICTIVE ELEMENTS 
If you are unsure whether an element is nonrestrictive (non-
essential) or restrictive (essential), consider it in the context of the 
whole sentence. If a term does not fully communicate your message 
without the modifier, the modifier is probably restrictive. On the 
other hand, if the modifier adds texture—interesting but not basic 
for your reader's comprehension—it is very likely a nonrestrictive 
element. 
Use commas to set off nonrestrictive clauses and 
phrases. 
Adjective clauses0 modify nouns or pronouns and usually be-
gin with who, whom, that, which, when, where, or why. When adjec-
tive clauses are nonrestrictive, set them off with commas. 
NONRESTRICTIVE CLAUSES 
Farming, which is a major source of food production, may 
not always be dependent on the weather. [Farming in this sen-
tence is not meant to be restricted by which is a major source of 
food production, so the information is not essential and commas 
are used.] 
Someday, food may be grown in places like Death Valley, where 
temperatures of 120° have been recorded for 43 consecutive 
days. Organic farmers, who use only natural substances to 
produce food, are appalled by the widespread use of chemicals 
in commercial agriculture. 
RESTRICTIVE CLAUSES , 
Much food t h a t is c a n n e d o r f r o z e n is grown ^ by the same large 
companies t h a t p rocess i t f o r c o n s u m p t i o n . [The first restrictive 
clausfe limits the general word food to only food that is canned or 
f rozen; the second one restricts the large companies to only those 
that process the food for consumpt ion. The information in both 
cases is essential.] 
Cooling on the window might be a peach pie whose steaming 
crust was made with bear grease. 
—EDWARD A. HOEY, "More Need for Elbow Room" 
A phrase is a group of related words without a subject, a pred-
icate, or both. Set nonrestrictive phrases off with commas. 
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lay very badly in the Olympics. 
read this sentence, it can have two meanings, 
t>ably meant the following: 
badly to play in the Olympics. 
tig because "very badly" can modify either 
n, He wants to play poorly). The same would 
he modifier: 
ly. very much in the Olympics. 
r that he very much wants to play, or that he 
of playing time. When a structure can modify 
11 it a squinting modifier, as in the following: 
eace Corps volunteer I was looking for 
? children were astonished by the sight of 
8 Aug. 1991 
he Peace Corps volunteer later, or did the 
ater? The second turned out to be the case, 
eed to relocate the modifier: 
>ace Corps volunteer I was looking for 
children . . . 
an Peace Corps volunteer I was looking 
ith other kinds of misplaced ad verbial mod-
i f ie r me on the outside. 
t: to say, "I acted on the outside as if it didn't 
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Definition 177 
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Prepositions at the End of Sentences 181 
Wrong Places: Prepositional Phrases 181 
Definition 
Prepositions are words like those boldfaced in die following sentence: 
They had a house of crystal pillars on the planet Mars by the 
edge of an empty sea, and every morning you could see Mrs. K 
eating the golden fruits that grew from the crystal walls, or 
* cleaning the house with handfuls of magnetic dust which, tak-
ing all the dirt with it, blew away on the hot wind. 
—Ray Bradbury, Martian Chronicles 
As the example shows, a preposition does the following: r 
I forms a modifying phrase by linking a noun or noun substitute (its 
object) to some other word in the sentence, usually a noun or a verb 
I links by expressing or defining a relationship between its object (and 
its modifiers) and the word modified 
In the Bradbury sentence, then, "of crystal pillars" is a phrase inside 
of a phrase, an adjectival modifier of "house," the direct object of "had": 
the house is composed of crystal pillars. 
subj verb dirobj " , 
They had a house of crystal pillars 
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178 Part 1 Grammar 
noun prep phrase (adj) 
a house of crystal pillars 
prep obj 
of crystal pillars 
The next two phrases modify had: 
They had it oh the planet Mars 
by the edge of an empty sea 
As this example shows, prepositional phrases can also be part of other 
prepositional phrases: 
prep obj 
by the edge of an empty sea 
prep obj 
of an empty sea 
Note: On rare occasions prepositional phrases can also function as 
nouns: 
• *i 
subj 
Outside the Public Library is where we first met. 
—William Saroyan, Bicycle Rider in Beverly Hills 
Kinds of Prepositions m 
In structural terms there are two kinds of prepositions, simple and 
compound. Simple prepositions are one-word prepositions. Many of the 
same words can act as adverbs. The difference is that adverbs appear 
alone while prepositions have objects. Here are the most common: 
about 
above 
across 
after 
against 
along 
amid 
among 
around 
as 
before 
behind 
below 
beneath 
beside 
besides 
between 
beyond 
but 
by 
concerning 
despite 
down 
during 
excepting 
for 
from 
in 
inside 
into 
like 
near 
of 
off 
on 
onto 
opposite 
out 
over 
past 
< 
und 
unc 
unt 
unt 
regarding throughout 
save till 
since to 
through toward(s) 
Note: By some estimates, nine prepc 
percent of all prepositional use: of, on, to,. 
Compound prepositions are groups of wc 
ositions, serving as single prepositions, £ 
across from 
ahead of 
along with 
apart from 
as for 
aside from 
as well as 
at about 
away at 
away from 
back in 
back of 
back through 
back to 
back toward 
back with 
because of 
belonging to 
by means of 
by reason of 
by way of 
contrary to 
down by { 
down from 
down to 
down upon 
due to* 
except for '( 
exclusive of 
for fear of 
for the sake of 
in addition to 
in behalf of 
in back of 
in case of 
in company wi 
in favor of 
in front of 
in place of 
in regard to 
inside of 
in spite of 
instead of 
into 
I 
* Be warned that some people object to the use o 
have learned that relief ace Dennis Eckersley wil 
shoulder muscle." Despite its occasional use by t 
risky in formal writing. 
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empty sea 
I phrases can also be part of other 
ional phrases can also function as 
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regarding 
save 
since 
through 
throughout 
till 
to 
toward(s) 
under 
underneath 
until 
unto 
upon 
with 
within 
without 
Note: By some estimates, nine prepositions account for about 90 
percent of all prepositional use: of, on, to, at, by, for, from, in, and with. 
Compound prepositions are groups of words, often just pairs of prep-
ositions, serving as single prepositions. Here are most of them: 
* Be warned that some people object to the use of due to to mean "because of": "The A's 
have learned that relief ace Dennis Eckersley will be out for two weeks due to a strained 
shoulder muscle." Despite its occasional use by some professional writers, due to is still 
risky in formal writing. 
across from 
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along with 
apart from 
as for 
aside from 
as well as 
at about 
away at 
away from 
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back of 
back through 
back to 
back toward 
back with 
because of 
belonging to 
by means of 
by reason of 
by way of 
contrary to 
down by 
down from 
down to 
down upon 
due to* 
except for 
exclusive of 
for fear of 
for the sake of 
in addition to 
in behalf of 
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in case of 
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in favor of 
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in regard to 
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up against with a view 
up by with reference to 
up on with regard to 
up to with respect to 
with the exception of 
within 
without 
v±figcausei of Siaf r " ' ' 
Bvf *' 
Prepositions and Idiom 
English forms many idiomatic expressions with prepositions. Hence, 
we can alter the meaning of many verbs, nouns, and adjectives by 
combining them with specific prepositions. We are in the habit of, not 
by or withy we infer from and are proficient in; on some occasions we 
agree to, and on others we agree with or on; and so forth/Occasionally 
tripping up even native speakers, such idioms are among the last details 
mastered by those learning English as a second language. If you have 
difficulties with prepositional idioms, you should listen for awkward-
sounding structures when reading your papers aloud. If some expres-
sion sounds questionable, consult an unabridged dictionary. I t will 
include sample quotations to illustrate idiomatic usage. 
Prepositions and Case 
Pronouns serving as objects of prepositions are in the objective case {me, 
him, her, us, them). This practice does not cause difficulty for most users, 
except when a preposition has compound objects. We often hear people 
say, "between you and I," or "like you and I," when technically the 
form should be "between you and me," and "like you and me." When 
in doubt, place the first-person pronoun first. Few will like the sound 
of "between / a n d you" or "like / and you." 
Prepositions and Subject- Verb Agreement 
Sometimes there is confusion when a singular subject is modified by 
a prepositional phrase with a plural object. The noun or pronoun near-
est to the verb is plural, so some yield to the impulse to make the verb 
plural: 
sing pi 
Each of them is . . , (each is) 
sing pi 
The source of the troubles is . . . (the i 
The same rule applies when there is an int^ 
sing 
Not 
But 
A phrase is a group of related vv 
single part of speech, (words fund 
A phrase is a group of related w 
single part of speech, (agroup fan 
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did not say that writers should never do il 
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"rule," even by professional writers like A 
All men are snobs about something, 
add: There is nothing about which rc 
—"Selected Snobberies" ^ 
To some, "about which" has a formal, ei 
Huxley would have risked the criticism ( 
"There is nothing which men cannot feel 
Wrong Places: Prepositional i 
Prepositional phrases acting as adjectives 
the word they modify, but those acting 
This mobility does not mean, however, 
anywhere: 
As early as 10,000 years ago Paleo-lf 
bison that are now extinct on foot i 
—"A Paleo-Indian Bison Kill," Scientific Amen 
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sing pi 
The source of the troubles is (the source is) 
[he same rule applies when there is an intervening relative pronoun: 
sing pi 
Not A phrase is a group of related words that function as a 
single part of speech, (words function) 
But A phrase is a group of related words that functions as a 
single part of speech, (agroup functions) 
^Prepositions at the End of Sentences 
^Even people who cannot tell a preposition from a parsnip "know" that 
|fa preposition is something you should not end a sentence with. This 
*"' belief is a distortion of some stylistic advice dating from the seventeenth 
century. Observing that the final position in a sentence is emphatic, 
the poet and critic John Dryden recommended that we should usually 
save it for a word heavy in meaning-—a noun or adjective or verb— 
and not for a preposition, which generally has less meaning (being what 
modern grammarians call a structure rather than a content word). Dryden 
did not say that writers should never do it, only that they should not 
do it too often. His rhetorical opinion was eventually accepted as a 
"rule," even by professional writers like Aldous Huxley: 
All men are snobs about something. One is almost tempted to 
add: There is nothing about which men cannot feel snobbish. 
—"Selected Snobberies" 
To some, "about which" has a formal, even awkward ring to it, but 
Huxley would have risked the criticism of purists if he had written, 
"There is nothing which men cannot feel snobbish about." 
Wrong Places: Prepositional Phrases 
Prepositional phrases acting as adjectives almost always go right after 
the word they modify, but those acting as adverbs are more mobile. 
This mobility does not mean, however, that we can place them just 
anywhere: 
As early as 10,000 years ago Paleo-lndians hunted species of 
bison that are now extinct on foot and with spears. 
—"A Paleo-Indian Bison Kill," Scientific American, Jan. 1967 
ifcr 
i iEasS" i If**1— i ,,gs£ 
i " j ^ 
!:&**>• 
•j ! ^ i ; 
IS"*. 
«4**fe 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
1 8 2 Part 1 Grammar 
"On foot and with spears" is too far away from "hunted," and our first 
impulse is to attach the phrase to "extinct." The effect would be less 
awkward if we relocated the phrase: 
As early as 10,000 years ago, on foot and with spears, Paleo-
Indians hunted species of bison that are now extinct. 
Or: 
As early as 10,000 years ago, Paleo-lndians hunted now-extinct 
species of bison on foot and with spears. 
Notice that the first revision also changes thf focus from how the early 
Indians hunted to the fact that their prey is now extinct. The "news" 
of the sentence has changed. 
, And what of the following lapse by a highly respected novelist? 
Can you rephrase the sentence to help it read more clearly? 
There was no point in telling Phuong, for that would be to 
poison the few months we had left with tears and quarrels. 
—Graham Greene, The Quiet American 
For a moment the sentence seems to say that they have this time left 
with tears and quarrels, and the narrator does not want to poison it. 
Of course, he actually means that tears and quarrels will poison the 
time they have left. Because of the misplaced prepositional phrase, 
meaning and structure conflict, arm-wrestling when they should be 
working hand in hand. 
Here's one more example from an ad in the classifieds: 
For sale, Mazda RX7 driven by prof, woman with great body 
and low miles, $3400. 
Conjunction. 
[* 
Definition 183 
Kinds of Conjunctions 183 
Wrong Places: Faulty Parallelism with Corrt 
Definition 
Conjunctions are words like those boldfaced ii 
Steroids can enhance muscle mass. T 
they do not just decrease sexual capacit 
heart, and do sundry other damages. Sc 
athlete's body, he can mess it up as he | 
often involve injury. But it is one thing 1 
ertion, another to injure yourself with cl 
the ultimate "edge." And it is surely un1 
ponent to choose between risking harm 
disadvantage. 
—George F. Will, The Morning After: American Succt 
Conjunctions, then, are connectors, words t 
or clauses. 
Kinds of Conjunctions 
Normally, we distinguish three kinds of conjui 
ordmating, and correlative. 
Coordinating Conjunctions 
Coordinating conjunctions join equals—words, p 
same grammatical rank. There are only seven: 
and but or nor for yet so 
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House Bill 110 - 1990 - Session 2 & 3 Page 1 
Severance Tax Incentives for Petroleum Industry Recovery 
Mr. Speaker: Excuse me Representative. We need to have that 
read in I believe is that right? Madame Reading 
Clerk. 
Clerk: House Bill 110. Severance Tax Incentives for 
Petroleum Industry Recovery. Representative David 
Adams et al. Be it enacted by the Legislature of 
the State of Utah. 
Mr. Speaker: Representative Adams. 
Rep. Adams: On the pink sheet the 17 amendments that have been 
offered by myself I would move for their 
acceptance. 
Mr. Speaker: Motion is we accept the amendments to House Bill 
110 dated February 20 under Representative Adam's 
name. Proceed. 
Rep. LeBaron: To the amendments, the amendments, this bill has 
to do with the severance tax on oil and it 
addresses three area. It addresses the severance 
tax on oil. It addresses how we will tax wild cat 
wells and it addresses a tax credit that will be 
issued to those oil companies who will work over 
and improve the production of the wells. The 
amendments that I have offered will do three 
things. One, it will a, a change the severance 
tax rate and the current 4% to a sliding rate from 
3 to 5 percent. If the price of oil drops below 
$13 per barrel the severance tax would be 3%. On 
any amount above the $13 per barrel the severance 
tax would be 5%. The current law has a 4% rate 
straight through. A, the second part of the 
amendments establish a new account known as the 
"oil and gas incentive credit account" and 
deposits in that account 2.5 million dollars. It 
then allocates money to that fund based upon the 
change in the production of oil because of the 
increase in production because of the work over 
provisions. Those are the amendments. If we 
could get those out of the way then I'll address 
the bill. 
Mr. Speaker: To the amendments, 
to the amendment? 
Representative LeBaron. Anyone 
I see no lights on 
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( 
i 
Representative would you care to sum up. 
Rep. LeBaron: Waive summation on the amendment. 
Mr. Speaker: Motion is we accept the amendments and the book 
dated February 20 under Representative Adam's name 
starting on page 1, line 15 and ending on page 6, 
line 24. Those in favor say aye. (Aye) Opposed say 
no. Motion passes. 
i 
Rep. Adams: Representatives, substitutes under House Bill 110 
as amended. Ladies and gentlemen I've the oil 
patch of Utah we are in serious trouble in that 
production is declining and that has a tremendous 
affect on state revenue also. But a the number of 
unemployed in the Uintah Basin and the other ' 
producing counties, San Juan and Grand County, the 
economic impact of that has been severe. We've 
been studying for three years the way in which we 
might bring back to our communities employment. 
We might bring back to the state payments to sales 
tax and income tax and that we might increase the 
value of our homes that have been deteriorating at 
an alarming rate. And there, we have numerous 
people employed in these industries and if we get 
them back to work there increased oil supply we 
think we'll have three or four benefits of which I 
have described. We'll have increased employment 
out there and in fact we can think of no other 
bill that would have more economic impact that 
than the bill that is being proposed to 
you at this time. Let me tell you the three 
things that it does and why we are proposing them. 
One, it changes the severance rate on oil and gas. 
But there is a provision in there that delays the 
enactment of that for one year. In other words, 
until I think its June of 1991, then we will 
consider a change in the severance tax. The cost 
of producing oil in Utah is significantly, 
significantly higher than in the other areas. We 
do try to invest this in some and in fact I 
think our a, a, and we've tried to adjust for that 
in many ways. It costs about $80 a foot to drill 
oil in Utah and in the surrounding states the cost 
2 
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of that is $32 and in some cases lower than that. 
And the tax you pay in the state is one of the 
costs of production. And when the price of oil 
gets low, below $13 a barrel, it simply becomes 
uneconomical for the oil company to explore or to 
drill or produce oil in this state. So when the 
price of that drops below $13 a barrel we will 
simply drop our rate by, from the 4 to the 3 
percent. Conversely, when the price of oil goes 
up we need to be compensated for that reduction 
and there when it gets above of the $13 a barrel 
we will have an increased rate of 5%. The second 
part of this bill a, deals with the wild cat well. 
define what wild cat is. Last year in 
the state of Utah we had 13 wild cat wells. That 
is there was only 13 attempts to find new oil 
fields. In the surrounding states, and I might be 
a little bit wrong on the number, but I think in 
Wyoming we had 170 or in Colorado 176, in Wyoming 
230 some odd wild cat wells. In order to try to 
attract companies to explore for new oil in Utah 
there are significant leases around the state. 
Some of 21 acres or something and they haven't 
even started to look there. They think there's 
oil but they haven't even started to look. This 
bill provides a tax holiday of one year for any 
new producing wild cat well. Presently in law 
there is a six month tax holiday and we are 
proposing to increase that for twelve months. 
That is there will be no taxation on, no severance 
tax on new production of oil wells for one year. 
The third aspect of this bill has to do with work 
overs and in the bill we have a definition of what 
work overs is. And that is simply when you go 
into a, let me try to explain it. When you, oil 
production declines in a well that doesn't 
necessarily mean that there's less oil there it 
needs routine, needs maintenance and repair and 
you pull in on that well and work it over and 
redrill it and you might go to production at a 
different level. You might do various things, but 
the object is to produce new oil. A, and to get 
the production of that well higher. Now what we 
are offering in this bill is if the oil companies 
3 
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that will do that and go in and work over the 
wells and spend the money necessary to increase 
that production we will offer to them a 20% tax 
credit on the cost of improving that well up to 
$50,000 per well. There is a cap on it and we a, { 
putting out what we think is pretty good bait to 
draw the oil companies in and to increase the 
production in these wells. We're doing that by 
putting a sunset on this. They have to do these 
work overs within four years. The 20% tax credit 
will be in affect for four years and four years 
only and then it is sunsetted. A, in that 
commitment oil companies. Numerous 
representatives that if we, the oil 
companies that if we will revisit this issue and 
talk about the and pass this bill that they will 
a, the companies they will come in 
immediately to do the work over of these wells, 
that if in the process in developing their budgets 
that they will relook at the budget and come back 
and try to invest a significant amount of their 
work over budgets in Utah. Now I've heard from 
several people says well why do we want to do 
this? We think that the price of oil is going to 
go up and that we don't want to have increased oil 
production and the State would rather wait until 
it comes out at a higher price. And its as if the 
person who is the Director of the oil and gas were 
only here to tell you in much more eloquent terms 
that I could that is not the case. We have about 
51 million barrels of reserve out in the basin but 
the cost of redrilling these wells, if they're 
allowed to deteriorate we've become so expensive 
with the production that is already out of there 
there will not be enough to justify going back and 
redrilling the wells. But in fact if we do not 
have some type of work over and some type of 
production enhancement in the basin and in the oil 
wells they simply, we run the risk of never 
recovering those reserves. And I submit that to 
you on the faith that you will accept it because 
the Director of the oil and gas is not here to 
tell you that. But I think that's important that 
you understand. But we need to do this now if in 
4 
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fact we are not going to lose some of the reserves 
that we have out there. A, in the bill with the 
amendments that we made there is an established 
account and it is credited with $2.5 million 
dollars at this time. And I've, in that little 
handout I'll pass around to you if you will look 
at it I don't want to take your time. It talks, 
it shows you in there the type of revenue 
enhancement that we expect to see from this. A, 
we talk about increase in income taxes when we put 
these people back to work. We talk about 
increases in sales tax when these people begin to 
spend their money and we talk about the increase 
in the severance tax. Now the figures we used in 
this Representatives is unbelievably conservative. 
We assume that you spend $100,000 dollars to work 
over a well and that you only get an increase of 
$118,000 in production. The fact of the matter is 
that has to increase by significantly more than 
that or the oil wells won't do it. Like say from 
four to five to ten times that value that we 
projected in there. So we think there's going to 
be significant enhancement into the revenue 
project, revenue picture of the state. Now the 
$2.5 million dollars that we're putting into this 
account will be quickly depleted. And so it is 
put in, so the amendments in the bill if we can 
show, and they have to come in and apply to the 
Division of Oil and Gas in order to get this tax 
credit to get a work over, so we can identify the 
well, we can identify the production and with the 
new production that we get out of that well that 
we will keep a flow of funds going into this 
reserve account. That it will never exceed $2.5 
million dollars but for the four years that we 
want to do this we will have an account there with 
$2.5 million dollars to pay for these tax credits. 
Now the simply statement of that is what I'm 
telling you is working there will always be enough 
money in there to permit this type of a tax 
credit. If we don't get the of production 
increase that I'm telling you with that account 
will be depleted. A, I hope that you have 
understood what I've said and certainly be open to 
5 
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Mr. Speaker: 
Rep. Evans: 
Mr. Speaker: 
Rep. Adams: 
Mr. Speaker: 
Rep. Adams: 
Mr. Speaker: 
Rep. Nelson: 
any questions that you might have. Mr. Speaker. 
Following that long winded introduction, 
Representative Evans. 
Thank you Mr. Speaker. I'd like to in 
support of this bill and say it's not often we see 
such a grassroots effort from a community to try 
and look at what can be done to help their 
circumstances. I think if we had the opportunity 
to visit with most of you and many of you have the 
opportunity to visit the Uintah Basin you surely 
will recognize the type of impact that this 
industry has had on the area. It certainly also a 
win-win situation for the state of Utah because if 
we have increased production to renew drilling and 
also work over it has an economic impact 
with the increase in taxation that comes into this 
state. We've all seen the type of impacts 
taxation from this industry's had. It certainly 
is an incentive and I think the most important 
thing it that it sends out a message to the oil 
industry that the state of Utah is willing to 
create a climate to work with an industry that has 
a great deal of impact on this state. And I urge 
your support of this bill. 
Representative Adams, we need some clarification 
on your, the circle needs clarification on your 
amendments. On the second one you have page 1, 
line 6. Did you mean line 16? 
You talking about the second amendment item number 
2? 
Second amendment, yes. 
Kevin is that where we want it? Yes, it should 
actually be line 16. 
Okay. If you'd mark the change on that, technical 
change on that amendment. Representative Nelson. 
Thank you Mr. Speaker. I won't try to duplicate 
6 
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Mr. Speaker: 
Rep. LeBaron: 
Mr. Speaker: 
Rep. Adams: 
Mr. Speaker: 
Rep. LeBaron: 
Rep. Adams: 
the speech of Rep. Adams. He's covered most 
everything pretty thoroughly. But I would like to 
say that a group of us legislators toured the 
Uintah Basin last summer and we really say what 
the effect of the downturn in the petroleum 
industry had done to the country. It's just not 
the oil wells. It's not the oil companies that's 
depressed, but all the related and support 
companies and industries out there that have had 
to close down or laid off so they don't have two 
or three standby people working. The whole 
economy is depressed as a result of the downturn 
in the drilling industry and I would urge your 
support of this bill. I think that if we're going 
to have to revive the economy out in the Uintah 
Basin this bill is a must. Thank you very much. 
Representative LeBaron. 
Thank you Mr. Speaker. Would the Sponsor yield to 
a long winded question. 
Sponsor 
Surely. 
Rep. LEBaron: 
Rep. Adams: 
You may proceed. 
I really was impressed with your speech 
Representative. My question is short. Urn, I was 
looking at the rates that will apply. Their 
sliding scale and we'll slide it down when the 
price is down and up when it goes up. And you 
said right now its at $13 a barrel. 
No. No. The tax rate is 4% on everything no matter 
what the price is and I think the current price of 
oil is about $22 a barrel currently. The new tax 
structure that I'm proposing that a break is at 
$13 a barrel. 
Oh, alright. 
The price of oil is $13 a barrel and below the tax 
7 
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Rep. LeBaron: 
Rep. Adamis: 
Rep. LeBaron: 
Rep. Adams: 
Rep. LeBaron: 
Rep. Adams: 
Rep. LeBaron: 
Rep. Adams: 
Rep. LeBaron: 
Rep. Adams: 
Rep. LeBaron: 
rate is 3%. When it is above $13 a barrel begins 
to be taxed at 5%. 
At 5%. But is $20 a barrel now so it should be 
taxed at 5%. 
On 5% above, lets just call it $20. The $7, the 
difference between $13 and $20 will be taxed at 
• J o . 
I see. 
That from $13 below will continue to be taxed at 
3%. 
So when will a shift from 5% for where it is? 
When does it reach 5%? 
Yes, 
A, it gets close to 5% at about around $40 a 
barrel when it gets to be the full 5%. 
When the tax rate hits 5% on that, on that portion 
above $13 a barrel. 
Well, there is not 
The reason I'm going back to this, and I 
appreciate what your saying, and I'm not right. I 
guess this was kind of an arbitrary number. We 
don't know how it was set. But I'm impressed 
about one thing. I was chair when we increased 
the severance tax and I think we doubled it. And 
I remember I was kind of hard pressed to do it. 
It was hard for them to let us do it. But here 
you are voluntarily telling us when we can do it 
again and it doesn't, and may not be all that far 
away. And no one looks at the foreign 
international oil situation, I tried to read the 
report, we may not be all that far away from that. 
It looks to me like the risk to the state are, are 
relatively low. This looks like a good deal for 
8 
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the state and I think we should go for it. 
Rep. Adams: The answer to your question is yes. 
Mr. Speaker: Representative Ruston. 
Rep. Ruston: Yeah, I will speak in favor of this bill. Myself 
I've worked my whole life in the extraction 
industry. Lived in a community where it was the 
jobs were dependant on the fluxuation of the price 
of copper and when it went down everyone was laid 
off. I can testify there is a direct relationship 
between the severance tax and employment. A, the 
increase in the severance tax, the decrease does 
affect employment in any industry in this state 
and so we are doing something here that will be a 
positive im, impact on the employment in the 
Uintah Basin. I feel very upset we did something 
the other day that will have a negative impact on 
employment on the west part of Salt Lake County, 
but that's something that has been done and a so I 
just speak in favor of this bill and we might as 
well do what we can for part of the state if we 
did ignore another part. Thank you. 
Mr. Speaker: Representative Price. 
Rep. Price: Thank you Mr. Speaker. Fellow Legislators 
obviously I am speaking in favor of this bill. Am 
I on? Can you hear me? The trip we had out I'd 
like second what Representative Nelson has said 
was what I would like to elaborate on just a 
little. Last August we took Senators and 
Representatives out into the Uintah Basin and they 
did see first hand the things that we had and we 
seen a lot of service companies that had a lot of 
beautiful buildings and all these parking lots now 
going up in Leeds and a it looks terrible. Houses 
are empty. 200 of them. We've got plenty of 
them. And it's a buyers market out there and we 
invite any of you to come out and participate. 
But where for unemployment is 8, 9, 10 
percent and this would certainly give them 
opportunity for economic development. Jobs in the 
9 
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Mr. Speaker: 
Rep. Moran: 
area and help the state as a whole while they are 
doing that. I certain encourage a favorable vote 
on this. Thank you. 
Representative Moran. 
Thank you Mr. Speaker. I call for question on the 
motion. 
MR. Speaker: 
Rep. Stevens 
Rep. Adams: 
Rep. Stevens: 
Rep. Adams: 
Rep. Stevens: 
Rep. Adams: 
Question has been called for. Discussion to that 
motion. Those in favor say aye (Aye). Opposed say 
no. (No). Motion fails. Representative Stevens. 
Thank you Mr. Speaker. I'd like to ask the 
Sponsor a question and reserve the right to make a 
motion if I proceed. 
Yes, 
Okay. Representative Adams you indicate, first of 
all let me just state that I rise in support of 
the bill. There's a couple of technical 
amendments that I'm wondering need to be made and 
maybe you can help me with these. On the first 
page of you pink sheet on number 3, page 2, line 
20, it said that this drilling needs to take place 
during January 1, 1990 and December 31, 1994. 
That's a five year period and you indicate that 
you're looking for four years. What is that, what 
is your plan? Is it suppose to be five years or 
is it four years? 
It's five years. I'm sorry if I mislead you on my 
opening comments. I was winging it. I did not 
have no . This is a, math says its four, but 
I think if you count it is probably five years. 
Yeah. 
I think the five years is going to be alright 
because it's going to take a year to get geared up 
and we wanted to, we wanted to get the impact over 
a four year period is what we thought we needed to 
get the full impact. But as a major oil company 
10 
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budget it takes a time frame and so we're talking 
about a year to advise everybody and to advertise 
it we've got in four years to get the out 
of it. 
Rep. Stevens: And I'd be in support of that. The other question 
that I had. On page, on the pink amendments, line 
14, second page, it talks about this restrict 
account fund. What's going to happen to this 
account at the end of this five year period? 
Rep. Adams: The intent of the bill is to have $2.5 million 
dollars added. It might be used up and it might 
not be used up. And if at the end of the pioneers 
there's an account there and there's a balance in 
it and I can't make you a promise, but I suspect 
there will be a balance in there that would simply 
return to the general fund. Unless we have such 
magnificent success with this program we choose to 
go on with it. 
Rep. Stevens: I'd like to propose an amendment Mr. Speaker and I 
think this will be a friendly amendment, but I 
need to ask for some suspension of the rules as 
the amendment is 18 words long rather than 15. 
I'd like to ask that we suspend the rules for 
purpose of . 
Mr. Speaker: Those in favor of suspending the rules says aye 
(Aye). Opposed say no. Motion passes two to one. 
Rep. Stevens: The amendment that I would like to propose is on 
the pink sheet at the end of the paragraph number 
14. So it would be page 6, line 2, continued but 
at the end of that paragraph would be a new 
sentence to read this, "This account shall be 
closed 
? Representative tell me again where that amendment 
is. 
Rep. Stevens: On the second page of the pink sheets. 
? Ok. 
11 
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Rep. Stevens: Under number 14 
? Ok. 
Rep. Stevens: 
? 
Rep. Stevens: 
Rep. Stevens: 
Rep. Adams: 
Mr. Speaker: 
Rep. Adams: 
Mr. Speaker: 
Rep. Nix: 
•? 
Mr. Speaker: 
Rep. Stevens: 
At the end of the large paragraph there. 
After the 4. 
After subsection 4. Correct. The amendment would 
be, "This account shall be closed and the fund 
balance shall revert to the general fund on 
December 31, 1994." I think 
Did you circle that back? Ok. 
I think that this will clarify what Representative 
Adams intentions are here and I, the concern I 
have is we seem to be getting a lot of these 
restrictive type accounts in our state government 
and I think this bill is an excellent bill. Just 
keeping my remarks to the amendment first. Urn, 
but I would like to see this in here so we know 
what happens to that fund at the end of that five 
year period. 
Mr. Speaker. 
Representative Adams. 
That's the full intent I view it as a friendly 
amendment and would, would call for a question on 
the amendment. 
I'll have to rule you out of order on that. 
Discussion to the motion. Both of you who have 
your lights on. Representative Nix. 
Question to the sponsor of the amendment. 
Will the sponsor to the amendment yield? 
Sponsor yield? 
Yes. 
12 
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Mr. Speaker: 
Rep. Nix: 
Proceed. 
And this may have to go to Rep. Adams. My 
question is "At this particular point in time will 
all of the monies that is coming into the fund 
have returned to it or will you still have 
outstanding monies coming into it after that 
date?" 
Rep. Stevens: 
Rep. Nix: 
Rep. Stevens: 
Rep. Nix: 
Mr. Speaker: 
Rep. Adams? 
Mr. Speaker: 
Rep. Steven: 
It's my understanding as I've talked to caucus 
Rep. Adams the account is to stay at $2.5 million 
maximum. So if there is more money than that 
coming in the overage goes to the general fund 
anyway. 
I see. 
So at the end of this five year period the overage 
would continue to go out, actually all of the 
money would go there because the account would be 
closed plus the balance in the account. 
Okay. That answers my question. Thank you. 
Representative Oakey to the amendment. 
Representative Maxfield to the amendment. I see 
no more lights. Would you like to sum up. 
Waive summation. 
Summation is waived. The motion, the amendment is 
page 6, line 2, after section 4, insert the new 
section "This account shall be cleared, shall be 
closed and the fund balance shall revert to the 
general fund on December 31, 1994." To that 
amendment those in favor say aye (Aye) Opposed say 
no. Motion passes. 
Mr. Speaker if I could just speak briefly to the 
bill. I know I have taken more of my share of 
time. Let me just say that I'm in support of the 
bill. I think it's a great concept. We get our 
initial investment back assuming things go as 
planned. It's a self-sustaining fund and it 
13 
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really helps revitalize the economy in that area. 
I am in full support. 
Mr. Speaker: Rep. James. 
Rep. James: Thank you Mr. Speaker. I'd like to speak in 
support of the bill. It's an economic development 
bill for several counties in our oil fields of 
Utah. And I'd much rather see Utah money help 
Utah business than Utah money be invested in the 
Pacific Rim nation. I encourage your support on 
it. This is truly a good, good budgetary item on 
economic development for those depressed areas. 
Thank you. 
Mr. Speaker: I see no further lights. Rep. Adams would you 
like to sum up? 
? Yes Mr. Speaker we have a technical amendment that 
we need to have made if we could. 
Mr. Speaker: Okay. 
? On page 5, line 9, delete 
Mr. Speaker: Is this on the bill or the pink amendment. 
? Is this he pink? It's on the pink sheet. 
Mr. Speaker: Okay. 
? It's number 13 on the pink sheet. 
Mr. Speaker: Okay. 
? And we're going to delete, it's not on there. 
Delete 201 and insert 151. 
Mr. Speaker: Representative I have 151 on my amendment. 
? I'm sorry I directed you to the circle to the 
wrong page. It's 5 in the substitute bill. Page 
5 in the substitute bill. And its line 9. 
14 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
House Bill 110 - 1990 - Session 2 & 3 Page 15 
Severance Tax Incentives for Petroleum Industry Recovery 
Mr. Speaker; Okay. 
END OF SESSION 2 
SESSION 3 
? And there delete the figure $2.01. And insert the 
figure $1.51. 
Mr. Speaker: Okay. To that motion. of order Senator Nix. 
Sen. Nix: That amendment is already on the pink sheet that 
we've approved. Number 13. 
Mr. Speaker: I think the pink amendment it says after 151 and 
there is no 151 to amend. 
Rep. Nix: Oh so you're deleting? 
Mr. Speaker: Yeah. 
Rep. ? And you're going to insert the figure $1.51 and 
delete the figure $2.01. 
Mr. Speaker: Alright that amendment has been noted. Discussion 
to the amendment. Seeing none we'll call for the 
question on it. Those in favor say aye (Aye). 
Opposed say no. Goes for the amended. Now . 
? Representatives we've spoken long on the bill. I 
don't want to take any more of your time but this 
is an extremely important measure. We'll think 
we'll have a positive impact on the state and we 
would solicit your support. 
Mr. Speaker: Voting is open on House Bill 110 as amended. 
Here's the chair that all present have voted. 
Voting will be closed on House Bill 110 as 
amended. Having received 65 affirmative vote, 3 
negative votes, passes this House and will be sent 
to the Senate for their action. 
15 
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a f te r January I f 1990» 
(3) j]bfi_rg i » e ft t ab L i *h cd a re at r I c E**d account v i thin t he tfcagr&i 
Fimd jggjro ajf the Hoil and g&g iricffatiyg: creditaccount.*1 1 Thffr&jLl 
*PJ:!:g£gl*J;A^..lliAl^JP^ I g ***** acc0«jtt$ e f l f e ^ ' ^ e tipon t h e t g a a a a g f e g g 
£&i»
 r.fr$U I** addi t ion a i l ci£v revenues obtsitied f.TQ°...pgy.....Pt!5Jif.g^igg 
nh&ll h% deposited in ^the^jaccQunt^to CJIC extent necessary to rofl,,i»t«,in , « 
Bitetoft \!Of ^ ^ ^ y W f f . j i t t the account and sh&Ii be uated to provide the 
- jJEffiJ-E ^ ^ g r Subsist Ian (&)» 'Hug aci c m n t . ^ ^ and thq £tM*<i 
balance sha l l rfev&rt to the General fund jem Decentber3LJ( 1954* 
$1) A working inter&gt ownfT-,..-*^-' pays for mil or f a r t o l fchg 
egpgnsejg^^ or workovttr : » er^ C iCl^4 tg.jjO.fl* c.rej-f,'^  gftH^A 
to 1QX of the amount paid* Thft c red i t far eaeb recglEE&^ffTO w.^9.rkoyjg:r 
nsay ROC *»?£€% g 4 §5Q8QQC? per ^eU»_The tax c red i t sha l l apply HPdftf... thtft-
chapter For thm tag&M-g y s a r . i n which the y3_go«pj.eLLDtt ar jtgyko^ig I* 
ca^^l^t^d and shaft tns. cliiiig^, qi>A^.gr^y.. Jggl^PJPl g.g.-.jjff ^*'*^ qoarfcer; 
&Et<r recoup I e^fttt^4t-C.Sr...yor^vg.r„ A A gg^pl,5^jg4ri-r^^..e.r r u ^ a mA^^ by fcti'ij 
^ M J J s i c m * Tftjg' iffiiifH&im. tJyl. l l i ^ l ' l tA^te .At . jq i^ i ib t pp December 3 1 1 
1996. 
££§£] <5j These taxes ar«e it* arfditifttk to a l l athfir tnxe,* pfuvr|'4i»j '^P-
lav and are d e l i f i ^ n t f t ialtt i i fttliervUe deterred* on Juns 1 next 
HiA 
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If. B, Ho. 110 
Succegdiftg the calendar year when ths o i l or gas iff produced, saved, «ncj 
sold or transported irtam the pressisep.* 
t W J i i l With respect to the tax imposed by t h i s ch-apisr on saeh 
owner of pi I or gas or in chs proceeds of £he production; of chosa 
substances produced in tfce. ?t«te» £4ch owner K* UA&UI for the t&x in 
proportion to cht auao***.lft!»f«*t in tha production or i'a tti* pro<$£**Ia 
of tijc prodt&tlotu 
[4£>] CH ~^e *a* sha l l be paid by Sach 'producer pursuaafc i:o 
.4greeEe.nl on behalf &£ the producer and on behalf of each owner exit£-£^$4, 
to pa r t i c ipa t e , is. , the o i l or gas sold by the producer or t ransported by 
JUM^pro4i*C£ir ;lirom I f e . : £ i j ^ . . j ? ^ ^ ^ » ; , ? 8 i l or &*# i s produced, 
[ft*l |S) Btdtrjmiucev *fc«& i t te i ; tit* e«* from ttut **mmt»:ftiK3»tr 
oth^r owner* for tfce production or the proc^*ds of th* production* * 
S&cticm 3> Effective Date ~- Retrospect ive Operation* 
Th i a ac E take a g f f get u p«?n app ro wat I and h a s re t r psj?e c_t i yg ajgerj tjum 
to January 1, 199ET except SuBjW^S&tt 59-5-102 ( l ? (b ) T m i c b is effecjciwjf' 
July 1 , 1 9 9 1 . 
" 'rty*? 
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HOUSE OP I^EPRBSBOTATIYES 
STATE OF UTAH 
J1A STATE CAPITOL # 8&Ai*T L A K f ClTY 8 4 H 4 
January 2S, I984 
Mr* $p^aker and Mr. Presidentt 
Your Conference Cosamittee, consisting of Senators 
BuXlen, Barton and Swan and Representatives Brown, Pace 
and D, Johnson to which was rafered S*8* Ho. 112, OCCUPATION 
TAX XKCKEASB, hy Ben. Sullen, et al. , begs leava to report 
as followsJ 
i>age 4, line 17d; After the word "been* doloto 
the number "j3i0H and insert the number "20," 
Page 4r line 17jj After the wordwo£M delete 
the worda "one year* insert the words "six months*1 
ftittee 
Chairman Senate Committee 
pr 
^f/^^x*^^i^^*n^r^^M»''«^-;^rf-- <5§MimMll 
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1 S. B, t ta . 112 By C h * r i « » W. S u l l e n 
0 ftr<tnt C> p y t h o n _ 
^ «»«J&E!it£^^ 
10 I - V a r l A»*y. 
11 D a l « g . S t r a t f o r d 
12 P a u l £&g»r», 
13 Karl ,,$.,. ...jfocwt...... ,... 
1 4 ,% .«!£•.£ Y„. j«.< » i i l i jigMi 
15 DIM JL Mcfttillift 
16 L o v g l l 8* r -
17 Qw»r,ftr Bur . 
18 
19 AM ACT DILATING TO TfllE OCCUPATION TAX? MbQYlDtNG tOR AN 
20 ItfCftEASE IN THE TAX TO 4%; AND FROVIDIHC fQR lUmfcCWFECTIVI 
21 OPERATION. 
22 THIS ACT AMENDS SECTION S9-&-67, UTAH CQ&I AWMOTATEO 1951, AS 
23 LAST AMENDED BV CHAffM 2S7 , LAWS Of UTAH 1903* 
3 * B# i t irenctfcfd fey t ^ , . ^ A » l i t H g « . , 5 L . ^ . . S t a t * , o f u t i f t t 
2 5 S e c t i o n I . S*et i<m 59*5*67, Ut«h C M * An»s>t;*t#d 1353 < # * 
26 i M f t *roert^*d b y C h * p t * r 2 6 7 , Law* of Ut«ii 1 S 8 3 , i i «n*nd*d t o 
27 r**d$ 
28 59-* 5*6? > (1) E x c e p t «» o t h « r v r i i » ffpteifinally p i W i & f ^ 
29 III t f c l* * r t i e l * i * v « r y p«r«son «ng*g«d! l i t t h * trt**in»*n «!" 
30 a d & l a ? o r A x t r a c t i n g m « t * l l i f « r « \ 4 « minerf t l« in t h i a • t * t » * k * l i 
31 p a y t « t h e a t a t a *n o c c u p a t i o n taw 4»qy»i t o «n» pa*" 3«&£ a £ t N i 
3 1 ^ t o i f t amount r « c « i v # d J o r o r uh« *;«»•» v a l t i * P £ a ^ t a U i f r M W * * 
13 K l n a n l a s o l d , o r i n tfca e*#« OJ: u r a n l u a « I I 4 o t h * ? £i*«io.&*kia 
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-z-
**t P*II*U1I«> JO fMMJMO i| |pW $&, 1#MfMMr »ttnNHWfep|I| ^^ >f 
*»«?« Jfl *a*i m%m #**F>3*j tptWfc **«** utiasiipu 4* '*•*!*» ££ 
*tii* * %m ptww) •? Z*4*uf« mBtj)ii Mn ^| (T?j r£ 
•|HM9AfIftp #4 I« 
0€ 
n *¥ t«wxi» n^ -#tli |ft ^swviftj w j^t* ^^ #ajilrd ^ 
•* pwpi ***** *P*T* MR •&*; t***««?* «r» tanMfeinm jra <£«« ^ 
II '^Od »iq«U0«P*,7 * ft,,, *JlM j*^*^ »^ fiujaup «T»jtw|pI K 
Ui ** »P» **** WWJ Hf*)* ««W?i 40 *«*» ***} fclmMfe WMU«| it 
**n+ M 'IOIMWO* "*wrt*t 'iw **« xq pu^m* *tTia*M 
*n*t*Air&* **T J* **«®» jr« ivmom 4m '**** jo V*uwt9 
n 
$z •PU *ttoq t-j»fMm pt*>* *T p**»*l»» fvrai* m JJ t%) n 
**X9*miy* *iMM»jrnt*?9a 30 #*ia »m sif $*> tz 
*M*TTO »* *<1 H«t* **** £u# 403 »|»T94« *TO zt 
Xq pswiodtaf *w* o»wMte»90 M|* fcwnrfira jtoj *Ts*q «tx (^j tr 
•Xt* «»nidklAaO Ma m *9»feMI ttf «4fAMWK '94tt* <** «*<p a.*a*i 
*©j p»f t«p«** !***«** Ai*v 'p*Jt9*n*p » 'pvueditthn 'p?<,« 
• t *T |«wn »t<r"fTdAi w* IT *»* «cp 'p#n«&ts«** #| intuit* 
«tt II **** «n«ltt3M> **|* 09 ^Mpqiui *T THW|i *m F*** '•!»» 
v tttnromi** «TO '#**** *q* WW* p»m%m »T HM«ffT« «» j* 
'•MfWUd <p«f BKJUtJf pniOffiiOTn J* PT*» fWMT 'pftAM 'p«HB«Kad 
«JV inmmoosptvL PfT«« *<****** Mmrom uoqpwaaip&t K 
J*»Q SB '**fi 'Jf* mxa 10 P«XftA?T»P *» p|ft# p*nr ptonpoJUf 
*T t»««iit MD aMgft jri#A jtirpu#T*3 »t|^ jBUMwNiqowi ^m, T 
wnr «qR 00 WttifiafTftp «q n«q» pt» n«r A* p^p^oid ***** jtt^0 
TTf %% uawppw uf «KI H*^ »xn MBIU •p«npo*d *^»tc« ptnrj 
*q} wo^j p«)JO^«ttttJ% jia pio* puv 'P«AWB >»f»tipo^d *«atnr^qna 
«oq^mpAi| a*W puw ffe£ *TTO ttn JQ TT^ ^ ^ ^n^A 
^ $0 %$ |«K». «^ ^j ^ ttttlisa ^^ uot^dnooo urn »it4» «^ 
o» X*d ntq;a 'uonanpojtd ^nt ^a ap^^cud «n «T jkQ '^13k# <ta 
«T «tt»^ 40 n»^ 1 WOJJ P«91>P0Jld
 r
(U«0^Jte3oap^t| pn^ d^*D*J9^ 
'•»du«a«qnt uocpwaojpAq j«u*o J:O 'tn& 'no a? u*«^)UT 
a*t|^a A«s JO -uonanpoid ja ^ao Va«w^«d '^J91«I A^t*^»i 
^f«J>^f fiUi^OA) ^*^93Uf mr ftUjtoow.jKl^mpwi^ 
CD 99-S-6S t»n»*tqn* «f P*uTJ«p *te 'P»J»AH»P '•t»T4«%m 
Zll
 km ^ k$ 
OS 
At 
m 
a. 
n 
st 
21 
ft 
0! 
6 
8f 
L 
9 
S 
f 
D i g i t i z e d  b y  t h e  H o w a r d  W .  H u n t e r  L a w  L i b r a r y ,  J .  R e u b e n  C l a r k  L a w  S c h o o l ,  B Y U .  
M a c h i n e - g e n e r a t e d  O C R ,  m a y  c o n t a i n  e r r o r s .
a& Atit4H9iKKl9J *r©j id pt*** »Hf* «? *uroT****4o JtatsnpKxdl ££ 
**¥ P*** I>l*?* 31* JO •** *«*** «|* 14; 8«qi^B4#4Q A«I||IXP ££ 
t*f pmn »#s««^*«|aar uoq^a^o^p^ JS^O jta *»*& 'HQ {J%$ H 
*#nf*A «»*» af** *t<rww»«r*'»Ji sw^ wcfen ftai¥J**q| QZ 
*2&%z*$ %tt*Aftf«J |t» «tonvjr«p|iima o%uj to!*** 'TT*K #*p* $? 
3* *f*t»A *£**3 J*f*j *xq*«i$S¥sgi wq.^ autfuaa^ap 03 js^ad »*« *A»*| g? 
livcpi «t9¥*H«M» m& 'ptpwad «i *» p*Wtq**** *a*i «T *nT*ft « 
«** tt*m» 'p»»np©jcl **« Am^ qairqn «oa> 1*1**1 «P «I s«*wfcrod£ g£ 
*4T*ta JOJ »»***g »WUft *tfr Aq pw^pqps** n«* **S3 ** *fr-t*A ££ 
«M» &? 13*J3S*as * ?9 *3«»«qi «ft «| w *m* w jo •itqajnwl »*f* ** 
Jt©$ $3*>a*«fe&3 »pf| wpq w jvpcm pti|i^<{*^*K *nt*A «$* «K| TT*
11
?* £2' 
II** «n 3* *?H«A tt£t {wocGttraejpA'if pfte* tide?*?*} **3***-*#qp* ^ 
voqirattpftf xm&Q 49 **•& *n# jo 8813 #*£* u| {*) <q* Ifc 
-p»iD«p#p *eg tttt^i
 r
At«<* uaf}***od*K«;K| pa* '6upxT7».x *6nf!n*ai# $£ 
'JtafltdtaHi *ftttt£**«t J© ssos pu» &ti$t£-j:ai la ?*•«> »«* J<J SUNK! #V &T 
ptpJ*ft9£ »q *»x
a
l^* *W* &<i V**Q&*t VB*% uar^edsoao *m ita»T*IJ 81 
j« as-odsnd #*$* JEO| *n**t* «t*o* «oj:$j>rqp*j! .to nttu »m &un^*do u 
JQ }*&3 »q^ pov 'way* ***% J* H**$ « s* p*^**jq. &q tt»t|« «^M 9t 
uonsmp** s& nT* **?* 'wpa » q*?* «©TID»U«O3 UI *x«At«nxi>x» st 
p«^«4«do «| *^«OA uofqpnp^-s jrv^a t^tt inw w JI {jt%} $t 
'(l) C«) $%) Vtof%3*vqFiB 13T P»PlAO»jtd st p«^r.p*p *q o8i» Ct 
Aww g*53Brp u^Tiffaao^smwux. -*»64wq^ je> »^%«J tprss «uTiLt»i»p j:t 
o:i 4*A0<J «AV14 TI««« lSO|*fetlimo3 af*"> *m. A*39AOA^UOa JO ^?ISA* tt 
*M-^ «i 'SVOOLRO* *tr»pa«Kl©pijFT HJOJJ p*At»oaj *9^iTi«wn& *><Tf «T Qi 
pt:» jt»-i3»jr»^ *^1 Att*Ti^^*qni? j© «f«^a^tm o^ *HJfQ«« aDf^3fip»Jt & 
ao 'Jt>*t»Hs *TT1pa e^ Aq paxpdld^ #j|tt s* R»5»a *isr» »va g 
£^I^Hddt Aq psu-fitcjiaisp ^q o:j -atmount uv ^ss-Die* ^ou tf«tt* I^^TM^ 4 
't***ziTxp*p aq U*tt« ^T maJtj «q,3iipr)Jd o«n 6^i53»A!liX» put T»J«»WTW 9 
•if^ fiuT^Iwws puw ''auiXTT^ '6wTA***ifc
 Jfcuitdw«« ^oj sfr^v^D 5 
<^i ©-i^4 v ttOTi*aTW"J***$» »TtR *JCT PU« ^«U|JO»H^<J 10 *pa«^ojd 9 
«sa^& Bupjuiuavjp jo »«odind ;nn Jtoj uo?^^ai? «Tm, jo iSut^ttfwa c 
mtri UTM^IA •!*» « «v :^^«!#j£^ aq itvvf* T«^cKiutp «m '«t|*fa g 
5t::TmiH IO «i^:ttj aq^ fiumonuaa ^0 eyTLWO *^B»Jta^U| oars* atf* t 
rtt "OK '% *s 
D i g i t i z e d  b y  t h e  H o w a r d  W .  H u n t e r  L a w  L i b r a r y ,  J .  R e u b e n  C l a r k  L a w  S c h o o l ,  B Y U .  
M a c h i n e - g e n e r a t e d  O C R ,  m a y  c o n t a i n  e r r o r s .
$r B. No. 1X2 
1 recycl ing purposes sha l l not he i#ei.iid«d with t&a *>th«r 
2 productB in a r r iv ing a t the groats VaiUfc £t>t £ax purpose** 
3 (3) A«y contract between a pAraait assd A subsidiary 
4 company, or b*tvt*n cowp*ru#i« wholly or p a r t i a l l y owned by a 
% common parent , or fc>#tv«#rfc companies oth#rwi«« a f f i l i a t e d tha t 
6 spec i f i c s th« valy* of mineral• shall! not b# d««m*d bona fide 
7 unl«s* th» v«lw# of the » in#r» ls #p®ci$i&d i» proport ionate to 
5 the s i n e r a l ' s reasonable f a i r cash values. In. the AVGrit Of a 
9 controversy, the tax commission sha l l det«rmin# t )» r##son&b-l» 
10 f a i r c*sjh v»iu« ©£ ih* » i n t r » l . 
11 $4} An annual exemption frorc the payment af occupation 
12 tax .Imposed by thin a r t i c l e upon $50,000 in gr&as ValU# ©X th* 
13 iHiftarAifc shal l be alloy#d to *ath tnina, wall or wells &# 
14 defined in thlft Article, which in the c&s# ©f ©il* g**, *pc* 
15 et f t t r feydreearboa sufestanc** aha 11 fe* prorata** auaotHr fcbe owae-ris 
1$ i n proportion to the i r resp*ct iv* j t e * r * a t * in the production 
17 vft in that proceeds thereof. 
i S
 V * SftC-tUgft^/ This" act ahall . have retr<?sp^ctlv« ^3^ritlgm....t9 
1§
 J ^mn^yy 1, IWx 
si / : 01- .^.ioaMrt «»ynpt^ ^gc^itf^fl 
;
 ft**"' te&^^ 
, iMC^Iflii^'^w^lf1 ' iiifctfii j j f t . ^ 
yfil^flfe 
.^A.,.;>l,^ JXllJm.J,.^ ^Jiw:'M>, Mi, &Jj^lrlilfcJ*„&.?J11L .•». I, ^•';,^JT;..«.'».»«1& -i : lfL;IJ ;lly^i|jp^^^k^^^:^l^='eO.>l!i<g»-^^-B" i t ^ t h period or A ^aa well whose av 
ISMSlSl'ISKi 
ft: M t X i l ^ i ^ ; f ^ ' : t l f i ^ iC^f^aiPi t l to^ j :tiwi^j"Af j j t j t i f t fclt- j t^t j twW r : f j f f 
ftjjl^ 
ifiplRT '^f^ -
;«!§ tturtitdi *t&& tk%^^^m^^^fMik;mtjL 
CStBi.__ 
exemption wovided In febsectkm JtfeM? 
brM^iWoiaar 
i O 
' 1 
. 4 . 
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LEGISLATIVE GENERAL COUNSEL 
ApprQved____^_RAS 
Date 01/26/84 
{OCCUPATION TAX INCREASE) 
1984 
BUDGET SESSION 
By Cfaa//Jes W_. B u l j e n 
:J^%^^^^%4^^ 
m ACT RELATING TO TBZ OCCUPATION <$&?* PK&vlDI&d FOR AH 
INCREASE IN THE TAX TO 4%; AND PROVIDING FOR RETROSPECTIVE 
OPERATION. 
THIS ACT AMENDS SECTION 59-S-67, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953, AS 
LAST AMENDED BY CHAPTER 267, LAWS OF UTAH 1983. 
Bg A^fBig.^..^.. &V ^ e Legislature of the State oj^ JXtahj. 
Section L Section 59*5-67, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
last amended by Chapter 267, Laws of Utah 19B3, is amended to 
read: 
59-5-67. (1) Except ae otherwise specifically provided 
in t!iis article: every per&on -engaged in the business of 
fining or extracting metalliferoua minerals in this state shall 
pay to the state an occupation tax equal to one per cent of the 
gross amount received for or the gross value of metalliferous 
minerals? sold, or in the case of uranium and other fissionable 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
S. B. Ho. 112 
1 materials, delivered, as defined in subsection 59-5-66 (1) 
2 (k); and every person owning an interest {working interest, 
3 royalty interest, payments out of production, or any other 
4 interest) in oil, gas, or other hydrocarbon substances, 
5 (except solid hydrocarbons), produced from a well or wells In 
6 the state, or in the proceeds of such production, shall pay to 
7 the state an occupation tax equal to |%we p&* <se»%] 4g of the 
8 value at the well of the oil, gas and other hydrocarbon 
9 substances produced, saved, ^nd sold or transported frora the 
10 field where produced. These taxes shall be in addition to ail 
11 other taxes provided by law and shall be delinquent on the June 
12 1 neKt succeeding the calendar year when the mineral is 
13 produced and sold or delivered or the oil, gas, or other 
14 hydrocarbon substances (except solid hydrocarbons) are 
15 produced, saved, and sold or transported from such premises. 
16 If the mineral is shipped outside the state, this constitutes a 
17 sale, and the mineral is subject to the occupation tax. If the 
18 mineral is stockpiled, the tax is not applicable until it is 
19 sold, transported, or delivered. Any mineral stockpiled for 
20 more than two years, however, is subject to the occupation tax, 
21 (2) The basis for computing the occupation taK imposed by 
22 this article for any year shall be as follows! 
23 (a) In the case of metalliferous minerals; 
24 (i) if the mineral extracted is sold under a bona fide 
25 contract of sale, the amount of money or its equivalent 
26 actually received by the owner, lessee, contractor, or other 
27 person operating the mine or mining claim from the sale of all 
28 minerals during the calendar year, less a reasonable cost, if 
29 any, of transporting the mineral from the place where mined to 
30 the place where, under the contract of sale, the mineral is to 
31 be delivered. 
32 (ii) If the extracted mineral is treated at a mill, 
33 smelter, or reduction works which receives this type of mineral 
34 from independent sources and which is owned or controlled by 
•2-
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S. B. No. 112 
1 the same interests owning or controlling the mine or mining 
2 claim, this disposal shall be treated as a sale within the 
3 meaning of this section for the purpose of determining gross 
4 proceeds or otherwise, and in this determination a rate or 
5 charge for sampling, assaying, milling, and smelting the 
6 mineral and extracting the products from it shall be deducted, 
7 which shall not exceed an amount to be determined by applying 
8 the same rates as are applied by the mill, smelter, or 
9 reduction works, to minerals of substantially like character ^rid 
10 in like quantities received from independent sources. In the 
11 event of controversy the tax commission shall have power to 
12 determine such rates or charges. Transportation charges nay 
13 also be deducted as provided in subsection (2) (a) (i). 
14 (ill) If a mill or other reduction works is operated 
15 exclusively in connection with a mine, the mill or reduction 
18 works shall be treated as a part of the mine,, and the cost of 
17 operating the mill or reduction works shall, for the purpose of 
18 fixing the occupation tax imposed by this article, be regarded 
19 as part of the coat of mining and cost of assaying, sampling, 
20 smelting, refining, and transportation only, shall be deducted. 
21* (to) (i) In the case of oil, gas, or other hydrocarbon 
22
 u substances (except solid hydrocarbons) the value at the well 
23 shall b@ the value established under a bona fide contract for 
- 24 the purchase of the same or in the absence of a contract by the 
\ 25 value at the well established by the United States for royalty 
} 26 purposes in the field from which they are produced. When the 
27 value i# not established as so provided, the commission shall 
28 have the power to determine the reasonable fair cash value at 
29 the well, taking into consideration all relevant factors 
3D bearing upon the reasonable fair c&®h value. 
31 (ii) Oil, gas, or other hydrocarbon substances used in 
32 drilling operations in the same gas or oil field and in 
33 producing operations in this field or for repressuring or 
-3-
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1 recycling purposes shall not be included with the other 
2 products in arriving at the gross value for tax purposes. 
3
 (3) Any contract between a parent and a subsidiary 
4 company, or between eoiopanies wholly or par t ia l ly owned by a 
5 common parent, or between companies otherwise af f i l ia ted that 
6 specifies the valua of minerals shall not be defcra&d bona fide 
7 unless the value of the minerals specified i s proportionate to 
8 the mineral's reasonable fair cash value. In the event of a 
9 controversy, the tax commission shall determine the reasonable 
10 fair cash value of the mineral, 
11
 (4) An annual exemption from the payment of occupation 
12 tax imposed by th is a r t i c l e upon $50,000 in gross value of the 
13 minerals shall be allowed to each mine, well or well* as 
14 defined in th is a r t i c l e , which in the case of o i l , emu, end 
1$ other hydrocarbon substances shall be prorated among the owners 
16 ^in proportion to their respective in teres ts in the production 
1? or in the proceeds thexeof. 
• * 
17a tiHH (5) An annual excerptlem fro& the payi%ent of occupa t ion t a x I m p o s t by 
17b Subsect ion (1) on o i l , g a s , and o the r hydrocarbon subs t ances i s a l lowed when 
3-?c the wel l i s a s t r i p p e r w e l l , " S t t i p p e t w e l l " means an o i l v e i l whose average d a i l y 
4 7d p roduc t ton for the days the we l l has produced has been 30 b a r r e l a or l e s s of crude 
1 7 B g j l_a d a ^ ^ ^ d ^ ^ ^ J * - ^ .^ant^.. ..PArA0A.°.r B. fe.a.s. weA^. v>hosfr average d a i l y 
*^ p^ f r f e^A 0 ^ J?.?.?RrFA^.5£AiAs.. !>.eAn--^ mc^ o r A6/58 ° f n 3 t y t a ^ 
*^& • t a s a day_ ju^rj^^^ 9 0 d a y p e r i o d . The exemption i ft in a d d i t i o n 
* ^
 t0M, t^Lafc, FrDV,^^g-AA?L J^.&^AADA_1^1*_. 
17i (6) An execgptlon fro» the payment of occupation tax ig*pgag.4...J!y t M a article is 
1*3 allowed for a period of one year foil owing the 1st day of pjrodj£c;t_iqn_, _.Such 
l^k ,**effiPt:*-on. shall apply only to we.ll^ i. started ...after ...the ,.,JaftM*ry;. A.J . A984.,ef fectJLye 
171 date of this act. 
17a Section 2. The exemption provided in Subsection 59-5-6? (5) is ...void J£ it ..,j?reyeiitjg 
^
?n
 _thg DAc_uP.aAios1.. tflx t<tclB keAftfi t t ^ a t ^ A a § a deduction for federal tax purposes* HBH 
16 geetlon UM 12] jU KHH This act shall have retrospective operation to 
19 January 1, 198*. 
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Senate Bill 112, Occupation Tax Increase (Part 1) 
Clerk: Senate Bill 112, Occupation Tax Increase by 
Senator Bullen and others. 
Chair: Senator Bullen. 
Sen. Bullen: I see a lot of vacant seats. I can see seven right 
there, (in audible) I think we need the members 
here. I think that at least money wise this is an 
important bill. This is the Occupation Tax 
Increase. What it is is an increase on the 
severance of gas and oil at the value of the well 
head. It's a bill that we have had for a number 
of years. This doubles the tax. It raises it 
from 2% to 4%. Over the last two or three years 
we've had, at least as far as I have (inaudible) 
from this issue than anything else it is an 
important issue my personal opinion. I'd just as 
soon not be sponsor of any litigation that raises 
taxes, but we have to have schools and highways 
and the rest of the things that the government 
provides. I think to get a better balance in our 
tax structure I think this helps do that. I don't 
think we can go back and completely ask everyone 
to that I would be consider be paying more than 
there than there fair share. I'd just like to make 
one comment on that and then the sales tax at the 
end of June last year before we raised the first 
quarter in sales tax which was effect the first of 
July October 1 another 1/2 cent 
sales tax and then its been proposed here in this 
session that we go up another quarter, raise the 
sales tax three times in one year that tax goes 
directly to our people and I think we are among 
the highest in the nation now on sales tax. I'm 
going to propose have to pay it and 
take it away from 
them. The extent for most people who come in from 
outside our state and they tourists and so 
forth about 98% of the tax is paid by our 
residents in Utah. A traditional lease on an oil 
well as I understand it is the oil company that 
does the drilling and so forth gets and 
the person who has the mineral rights not 
necessarily the owner of the land, the person who 
owns the mineral rights gets l/8th. I went to the 
Tax Commission and I said an acreage in Utah what 
1 
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percentage of the mineral rights are all owned by 
residents of Utah by filing resident income tax 
returns. They said about 30%. And I said in 
dollars what is paid by them. They said about 85% 
of the mineral royalties were paid to people who 
were nonresidents of the state. So if you take 
the 15% multiplied by the 12 1/2 you get 1.8% or 
less than 2% of this tax would be paid to royalty 
owners for wells in the state of Utah. Now I know 
that won't fit into every case but its close to 
being accurate and a, I just submit there that 
this gives us much better balance in our tax 
structure if I had my way this would save 6% 
instead of 4 that I don't believe that practical 
and I think we've had adequate discussion on the 
bill. I'd be happy to answer any questions. 
Mre. Pres. Senator Swan. 
Sen. Swan: Mr. President I know that Senate Vaughn has made a 
very persuasive case for even 6% in the past and I 
think that is still a very logical figure for this 
tax. I would however propose that we amend the 
bill. I'd like to, page 2 and insert 5% on line 7 
rather than 4. The reason I do that is because 
there has been some discussion in the press I 
noticed an editorial which indicated that perhaps 
our tax package is not all that equitable and well 
^ . b a l a n c e d if we end up by putting the major 
increases on sales and I don't know if this 
possibility is maintaining the 1/2 cent sales tax 
increase but going an extra quarter if there is 
any likelihood of that. I would much prefer this 
thing is broaden the tax where we know the 
business is not heavily taxed in the state of Utah 
in comparison with national averages and our 
severance tax is not high. And for this reason I 
would move that we amend the bill to make the 
figure 5%. 
Mr. Pres. Senator Swan to change the sales tax 
from 6% to 5% on page, two lines. Discussion 
amended. Senator Barton. 
Sen. Barton: Thank you Mr. President. I'd like to urge the 
Senators to vote against this amendment. I of 
course am against any increase in the severance 
tax. I would like to remind everybody here that 
2 
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we're not only adding additional tax to oil but 
we're adding it to natural gas and if any of you 
heat your homes in natural gas which I'm sure most 
all of you do can realize the additional cost in 
that. I'd just hate to put the incentives 
on a time when we are trying to encourage all 
production in the state of Utah and when you 
consider all the other taxes that are gas and oil 
companies pay I just are addi production in the 
state of Utah. 
Mr. Pres. Corrections called amendments by 
Senator . All in favor of the 
amendment say aye. (Aye) Those opposed no. (No.) 
Motion fails. call on the bill. Further 
discussion. Senator.Sowards. 
Sen. Sowards: I didn't realize that we would be on this so fast 
Mr. President and the amendments are coming but 
the amendment that I alluded to as we treated the 
Kennecott case is this. We have to the 
fact even though we feel this is not a broad based 
tax. I do not feel that severance tax should be 
used to balance the budget, that a, a if you want 
to increase the severance tax then we should make 
an endowment fund from which to take care of the 
communities that will suffer the loss when these 
industries leave. That's really where that a 
mineral taxation should come into play. The mood 
of this body is to oppose the tax and so in order 
to a mitigate the tremendous impact on the 
communities in my district that are oil 
communities and may I a rehearse to you that I 
have Daggatt, Uintah, Duchesne, Wasatch, Summit 
and Carbon Counties. Now, including possibly San 
Juan and Grand Counties, now those are the big oil 
producers in this state. A if this tax, if it 
does in deed cause a decline in drilling its going 
to cause a tremendous impact on our community so I 
am not now talking about the oil company I am 
talking about the community. So I am proposing on 
page 4, lines 18 and 19, that we delete this in 
its entirety and insert the following. "An 
exception from the payment of occupation tax 
imposed by this article is allowed until a working 
interest owner has recovered the cost incurred as 
of the date of this act is finding, drilling, 
producing, operating and treating the production 
3 
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of natural gas, oil or other hydro carbon 
substances including solid hydro carbons from any 
wells completed after the date of this act. The 
cost to be included in determining the period or 
periods in which an working interest owner is 
recovering such costs of finding, drilling, 
producing, operating and treating production shall 
be determined by the Utah Board of Oil, Gas and 
Mining and shall include those costs described in 
a particular section and the acquisition cost of 
geological and geophysical information and 
interpretations related to the well and the costs 
of any compression process in sweeping and 
stabilization in a simple operation necessary the 
rate of production to pipeline quality. The 
exemption is in addition to that provided in 
subsection 4." Now, may I tell you that this 
would not diminish the amount of money we are 
calculating that this severance tax would bring 
us. It would be imposed on the present wells. 
The present income that is calculated. And I think 
that the analyst has calculated that to be $20 
million dollars would be unimpaired, but this is a 
drilling and exception that would allow 
a company to come in and drill a well and recover 
their costs before they are taxed. Now, let me 
point out how this works. If it's a good well 
lets say its an over thrust well. In two or three 
runs that well is paid for and your oil free. If 
it is a bad well that company is not penalized and 
they have some time to a recover costs of that 
drilling operation before they have to pay for it. 
Now one of the big things that we face in our 
communities is the service industry. I have 5,000 
people in Vernal alone that are employed in the 
service industry and they go out and primarily 
could take care of wild cat wells and our wild cat 
is going to be influenced greatly by the severance 
tax. So a why I appeal to you is yes, we are 
going to tax it include it. I do not 
want to disturb that tax base that the 4% will 
yield just what we say but when they signed on 
they will be allowed to recover their costs. Now 
a if its there for Kennecott and Flat I 
think was a, a with the and the 
people start weight counting when its fair for 
Chevron and Hydrobell and Pioneer and all of the 
people in that are in my areas because we have the 
4 
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highest degree of unemployment in this state at 
this time and we need a shot in the arm just like 
Kennecott needs a shot in the arm and like 
that. Thank you Mr. President and I move the 
adoption of this amendment. 
The adoption by Senator Sowards the 
amendments (inaudible) 
Philosophically I agree with everything Senator 
Sowards said. I have one major concern I 
have two. One is before they pay these taxes to 
us these oil companies are allowed to deduct the 
other taxes they have paid to the state and the 
federal government and also the windfall of 
property tax. It is my understanding that the 
Internal Revenue Service as a rule that if we 
change anything in our law other than that 
percentage figure they will not be allowed to do 
that and to many people they would prefer not to 
have this in the law. The other thing is this. 
Again, its not that this would apply but 
it seems to be that it does. The Wall Street 
Journal, January 6, 1984, Sohio may take 1983 
right off on Alaskan wells. Then it says "Firm 
says 1,600,000,000 search for oil on mount is 
turning back water. With wells that have been 
drilled, and I understand that in the high Uinta's 
we've had one of the deepest wells, or maybe the 
deepest well that has been drilled in the world, 
if they're able to reduce their income by those 
amounts then I don't think we would be getting 
back to 2% level let alone 4. 
May I report again from this report that was 
Tax Commission. On page 6, the top of the 
page it says, "The oil and gas victory in Utah is 
not a problem . There is a need for 
government assistance, a long term investment 
credits.'' Senator says will cost us 
anything. Of course it will cost us. Every time 
you create a loophole in any law you have costs. 
And particularly with all these very many things 
that are on this I don't know how you'd ever 
identify all of them and knowing oil companies 
that they're thinking more loopholes 
just through this one little thing than anything 
you could do. The other thing it may not cost 
5 
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this issue but it will next. Now if you have any 
estimate of what that will be? 
It depends on how many wells you're drilling. We 
don't know how many there will be. There will be 
a lot fewer because of this tax thing opposed I 
assure you that. 
the problem here you don't have 
to pay any sales tax because you owed any money. 
If I had to buy a loaf of local bread they won't 
ask you if you're paying income tax you have a lot 
of money you've paid the sales tax on that loaf of 
bread even it's the last dime you have and that's 
really what comparison everyone should pay sales 
tax Kennecott 
Well, you know, I, I going back to your first 
statement saying that the oil company, the oil 
interest is well and good. Now if that's the case 
lets reconsider the Kennecott deal and throw it 
out because they are well and good. In other 
words, Sohio is well. We don't have to worry 
about them, but I'm worried about my constituents. 
He's just like these other people worry about 
theirs. And if you want to throw the oil and gas 
thing out then lets throw the Kennecott thing out 
too. But lets be fair. I'm pleading with this 
body and, and I don't want to embarrass anybody 
but I'm pleading with this body to, to take, since 
you have decided not to go with a broad based tax 
and tax those people who are actually getting the 
(inaudible) to at least give the communities that 
are going to be hard hit a little break. 
Senator ?. 
Well I'm concerned Senator Sowards about the time 
that it would be necessary to build up in credit 
of the, of the severance tax. You've got so many 
drilling costs. So many things you are exempting 
here. It would seem to be that you are carrying 
through for years and years the time period before 
this particular operation would pay severance tax. 
Now it wouldn't affect this year's budget but 
beginning right now you've got everything here. 
All of your drilling. All of your exploratory 
costs. Everything is exempted then right? 
6 
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Sen. Sowards?: That's true. But what it a it shall be determined 
by the Utah Board of Oil and Gas. And so I think, 
I think they can close that gate. 
Sen. ? Well yeah, but even if they had accurate figures I 
don't know how the figures work out. The amount 
of severance tax that is paid as related to all of 
these costs. These costs are very high and our 
severance tax is very low. How long would it take 
as an exemption from severance tax. I wonder if a 
new well might be exempted for in I don't know how 
many years. 
Mr. Pres.: Senator I think we need to move on this. 
I favor the principle. I think Senator Sowards is 
right. As far as is concerned what 
we've done for Kennecott I take seriously we ought 
to do the same thing for a, an ailing industry up 
there in the Basin. I was wondering. Senator Swan 
brings out a very good point. There is a very 
good point there is a possibility that some of 
these costs might get over 10, 15, 20 years. We 
do consider putting in the exemption period would 
not be passed maybe five years. There's a period 
by which then if they go beyond that it doesn't 
make a difference. He says to take 20 years to 
get your costs back regardless. Let's just say 
that after five years you're gonna have to pay 
that anyway. 
I think that's a good amendment and if you'd like 
to place it . . . then why don't you incorporate 
in your amendment just the words "exception. Not 
to exceed five years." 
I will incorporate that. Okay. Now where do we 
put that. 
Right at the very end of your amendment. 
Okay. At the end of the amendment. 
And that's less than ten words and think 
, would you give it to the Clerk so she 
can write it down. 
I'd be glad to. 
7 
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9 You are place the first half of the wording 
"exemption" near the end. 
? I think that would be alright. 
? Not to exceed five years. 
? I would certainly prescribe to that and I think 
it's a logical request. 
? And then I would like to say to the body. I think 
we ought support the principle here. And I urge 
you to support this amendment. 
Mr. Pres. Now this amendment by Senator Sowards is changes 
he made to the five year limit on it. 
? Right. And while you're doing that Mr. President I 
think that Senator Pugh has discovered another 
inconsistency and I think it's only right. This 
says "from any wells completed" and we're going to 
change that from "completed" to "started." Is 
that the word you'd like? Now if you'll go down 
to the sixth line, second word over it says "wells 
completed" to "stated." That means that after the 
effective date you have to start the well not ones 
that are going right now. 
? (inaudible) Sentator Sowards amendments. 
? _____ from wells that have been completed is your 
amendment. Now if you say exempted from wells 
that are started then -
Sen. Sowards? started at the . . . 
? it means those wells that are in progress now. 
Sen. Sowards? No. A well could be going is that what you want 
Senator? 
? You really have to say wells the drilling of which 
was started after. In other words, the wells that 
were drilled prior to this bill would not be 
exempt. 
? This amendment indicated that this would only 
apply after the well ___. 
8 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
I've lost the amendment here. 
The other exempt is the exemption will only apply 
for a five year period. After that they would have 
to pay it. 
I __________ really works. 
I think it does as long as we understand what 
we're talking about. 
Well lets the other wording 
No, not necessary. I think it's clear enough. I 
was trying to clear it up for Senator Swan. 
Yes, thank you. 
Question. 
I think the only question that has been started 
they started to clear the ground and they, I'm not 
sure what started really is. 
With that 
paper. 
I think the drill of which has begun at. 
It makes . 
And then we know what drilling is okay. 
I think that's better because you can have them 
thinking about and start . I just 
want to be sure we under stand this. 
Senator 
I'd like to speak in opposition to that motion and 
to the entire motion. I don't want to take the 
floor to take up any time. But I think this is a 
weight on the State Treasury. Pure, simple and 
unadulterated. In Kennecott I voted against 
Kennecott because I was opposed to that principle, 
but this time at least Kennecott I was deferring 
9 
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the sales tax, but then they had to pay on the 
items they were using temporarily. This is 
recovery cost for the drilling of that well. That 
always included drilling Senator. I draw your 
attention to the last few lines that says "This is 
include those costs described in the geophysical 
information. Interpretation is related to the 
well and the cost of any compression processing 
and stabilize." That means every 
development. Every man. Every man out there 
on the seismic crew. Every helicopter you fly. 
And if you bring a producing well you pump it. 
You work it well and it close it down within your 
five years. I think it's a weight on the State 
Treasury. I think it's an insult to the taxpayers 
of the United States. The state of Utah and I 
guess I haven't felt this strong since yesterday. 
And I think that under the circumstances you're 
asking this body to adopt something which the 
taxpayers of this state will stand right up 
. And I'm really trying this 
amendment Senator in all I assume it's 
not your amendment I assume it's your friends 
amendment 
No, it's not my friend. 
And I assume that I'm not anything one 
way or the other, but I think this is asking this 
body to accept the whole not just the 
whole. If you talk at any time and particularly 
when you start talking about these limitations 
we're giving away the house. 
Mr. President may I answer his charge please? 
You may. 
You made my case for me Senator. Because it's the 
rod man. It's the geophysical. It's the mud man. 
That's what makes this state . That's the 
whole tax basis. Six counties. If we don't 
encourage drilling that won't happen. They ______ 
rob this state's treasury because you don't have 
income tax. Property tax. Sales tax that accrues 
from this. It's so much more than the little 
drilling incentive that you've lost complete sight 
of the economics. You've made my case for me. 
10 
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These are multiplicity of people that are 
involved. If, if it's a good well it's paid for 
in two months. And, and there's no problem. If 
it isn't then it encourages to go out and look for 
another and the rod man, and the geophysicist and 
all those people that are employed again and 
they're not employed today. And its, there's mass 
unemployment in these counties. Carbon and Uintah 
County and Emery County are the highest in the 
state of Utah. 
Senator ? 
Mr. President. I think first, in my opinion, this 
would be contrary to the IRS ruling and personally 
would negate the section of the bill. But when it 
comes to administration of I think it would be a 
nightmare to see whether our individual income 
tax. We take that away when we withhold that from 
a persons check. We take that out before they get 
it. When they go to buy groceries we take it out. 
They pay cash. We get that. We could administer 
those two administrations easy. When it comes to 
drilling a dry hole they get to charge-off the 
expense of those things now. That's the part we 
have here. This is a severance tax. This is based 
on production. If you don't produce anything of 
wealth you don't pay anything. I think if we put 
this amendment in it would virtually repeal the 2% 
that we already have on. 
May I conclude? Fellow Senators and Senator, 
likes that. I think that there's a case 
from both sides. But if you're going to take the 
money then you've got to consider what this tax 
does to the industry. The amendment is meant to 
be a drilling incentive amendment. A, if you 
don't have drilling incentives then you don't have 
wells. I assure you that infield drilling is 
going to go ahead. Senator Bull? Anchutz is going 
to go ahead and drill their wells in the Anchutz 
field. Anchutz is going to go ahead. Chevron, 
but, but the wild cat wells are drilled economics. 
And, and I'm trying to improve the economics of 
the new well and I want you to know that it's 
going to touch the money that you if you that it's 
not enough for another year you can look at the 
increase. But at least you haven't stymied the 
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Mr. Pres. 
drilling. You haven't killed the goose that lays 
the golden egg. A, you, we have got to look at 
that and with that I ask for question on the 
motion. 
______ call for a motion by Senator Sowards to 
amend all in favor of his amendments say aye, 
(Aye) Opposed no. (No). Senator Sowards 
amendment fails. 
Sen. Sowards: 
Mr. Pres 
Thank you. 
Now we have a bill before us 
Sen. Sowards: I would like to make another amendment. 
Mr. Pres. Senator Sowards, 
Sen. Sowards: Alright you have another page fellow Senators that 
is not numbered because we didn't know whether 
this other one would go and it's the stripper well 
exemption. For some reason I am not getting the 
allegiance that I thought I had when I agreed to 
go with this in closed circles. I will not say 
anymore than that. I thought that we were going 
to take care of some of these issues and were not, 
and that's not happening. But a I'll try another 
one. You're conscience will have to be your guide 
on this one. A, a manual exemption from the 
payment of occupation tax is allowed for the full, 
nope that's the wrong one. Here we go. An annual 
exemption for the payment of occupation tax is 
allowed for the full amount of the value at the 
well of the oil and gas or other hydrocarbon 
substance produced, saved and sold or transported 
from the field where produced when the well is a 
stripper well. Stripper well means an oil well 
whose average daily production for the days or 
part thereof the well has produced has been ten 
barrels or less of crude oil a day during any 
consecutive twelve month period or a gas well 
whose average daily production for the days or 
parts thereof has produce has been 60 million 
cubic feet or less of natural gas a day during any 
consecutive 90 day period. The exemption is 
addition to that provided in subsection 4. Now 
this is for the little wells that are marginal. 
You're, you will close those wells down no 
12 
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question about it. Its happened in other states 
but let your conscience be your guide. 
Mr. President. This amendment by Senator Sowards 
I assume is under special rules more than ten 
words. 
? 
It up. Okay. 
To the amendment. 
We already have an exemption of $50,000 towards 
stripper wells is that correct? That's what the 
law says. I previously 
per field. But $50,000 in income. I tried it one 
time to raise that to $100,000. I agree with you 
in concept on what you're trying to do here. But 
I was advised again there that that's contrary to 
the IRS ruling. They will not let us change 
anything but the percentage we have here prior to 
having the windfall profit tax or they won't allow 
the windfall profit tax to be deducted as part of 
this payment of this tax. If you do that it will 
raise the tax even high than it is. I would agree 
to this amendment if you could change the wording 
to put in some sort of a severability clause and I 
don't know how this can be done. But if you put 
in there that if the IRS rules of this would 
change the structure of our existing law or the 
percentage we have then then it was null and void 
then I'd vote for it. But I don't know that that 
can be done. 
call for by Senator Sowards. All in 
favor of his amendment say aye (Aye). Opposed no. 
(No). Amendments fails Senator Sowards. 
call for Senator 112. 
What if we said natural gas? Why only has the 6% 
tax we have the two raise ours to 4. 
Montana has . Alaska had 13.5% a year 
and then raised it to 15% and I believe there's 
more exploration going in Alaska than anywhere 
with having said that. One other point that 
should be cleared up. On natural gas up until now 
90% of our income comes from oil not natural gas. 
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Most of the natural gas that we burn in the state 
of Utah comes from Wyoming and Canada and other 
places other than the state of Utah where we 
produce and I've heard as high as 98%, I can't, or 
95% comes from outside the state. But I can tell 
you one thing for sure that everything we've 
learned that comes from Wyoming we're paying 6% on 
now the, the cost to are consumers that heats 
their home by passing this bill is infinitesimal. 
Pres. Question in call upon the bill. 
Vaughn: In suspension to the rules of how would, I would 
like to move that we consider Senate Bill 112 read 
for the second and third time and up for final 
passage so that it can go to the House. 
Pres, There is a motion by Senator Vaughn. Discussion. 
All in favor of the motion say aye (Aye). Opposed. 
Motion carries and Senate Bill 112 is up for final 
passage. The question that is so the bill passed. 
Roll call taken. 
Sowards? (inaudible) 
Pres. : You may. 
Sowards? I vote no. I would like to tell the body that I 
am very disappointed in your treatment of this. I 
do not think its fair. I think its extremely 
political to impose a tax on a business or a group 
of communities that is in the minority to do 
nothing for themselves. And of course I realize 
where I am coming from but I wanted it to be known 
as a matter of record that education and flooding 
are broad based problems and should be faced by 
the entirety of this state and not by a fuel.oil 
companies or my constituency. I think you have 
been very unfair and I give me my protest vote, 
no, no, no. 
Roll call continues. 
my vote please. 
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Mr. Pres. You may. 
? I'm consistently refused to vote for severance tax 
increase because I fill it is going to destroy the 
opportunity we have for development of that 
resource in our state. However, in the interest 
of education I will cast my vote aye. 
Roll call continues. 
Mr. Pres.? Senate Bill 112 having received 21 aye votes, 5 
nay vote and 3 being absent receiving 
constitutional majority and will be returned to 
the House for their further action. 
Sen. 
Christensen: Mr. President. 
Mr. Pres. Senator Christensen. 
Sen. 
Christensen: We'd now like to take Senate Bill 113 and move to 
the top of the Second Reading Calendar and 
consider that sales tax consideration now. I'd 
make that motion. 
Mr. Pres. Motion by Senator Christensen to move Senate Bill 
113 to the top of the Second Reading Calendar. 
All those in favor say aye. (Aye) Opposed. Motion 
carries. Senate Bill 113 is before us. 
Clerk: - Senate Bill 113 - Year End Sales Tax Collection 
Amendments by Senators Carley, Finlinson and 
Peterson. 
? Mr. President this is the acceleration of 
collection of sales tax bill. The crux of the 
bill is contained on page 6 of the bill. The 
amendments to the present act. Basically what it 
calls for is a payment by those affected to 
collect sales tax on 90% of their estimated 
liability as a prepayment for the second quarter 
of each hereafter on the 15th of June. Now that 
would involve the sales tax collected during the 
first two months of the second quarter 
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(Part 5) 
House Floor Debate - Senate Bill 112 - January 28, 1984 
Sen. 
Christensen: 
Mr. Speaker: 
Richards: 
Mr. Speaker: 
Mr. Speaker: 
? 
Mr. Speaker: 
I'm trying to get an oil well on my land. And 
they've been trying for about 3 5 years and they 
can't quite do it. So I speak hardly in favor of 
this amendment because it will encourage more, 
down where I come from for sure. We've got 
several dozen dry holes down there. Lets keep 
them trying. Lets give them this incentive. 
Thank you Mr. Speaker. 
? Richards. 
Mr. Speaker and fellow representatives we're 
getting to a late hour in our session. If we 
start to change now this bill it means going back 
to the senate. We're going to have trouble over 
there. They like the bill the way it is. It means 
going to a conference committee. Not only that 
but we're losing funds that we've anticipate to 
use in order to balance our budget. And if you, 
if you exempt for two years there are some large 
producing wells that will come in and will, will 
miss the income. And its income we that we 
needed. Now the propositions are to be given to 
you about the value the bill passed in the senate 
I suggest that we resist this amendment and move 
on and complete the bill. 
The staff has informed me that the numbering on 
the Dmitrich amendment must be changed to number 
six because of the Dwayne Johnson amendment. 
I was going to suggest that. When I got through 
Mr. Speaker it is corresponding with the Johnson 
amendment. 
We'll consider it so a, 
Can you just consider it in the circle. 
Yes. 
Thank you. 
Can I respond to that last bill or so. 
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Mr. Speaker: We'll come back to Senator Dmitrich to sum up. 
Dmitrich ?: First of all Representative Richards you have no 
assurance this bill will pass in its present form. 
These amendments make it a little more compatible 
for some of us to vote for. I'd like to mention 
earlier in a speech on a corporate franchise tax 
that Representative Brown, a good friend of mine, 
mentioned that we are increasing our corporate 
franchise tax. Fifty percent, he thought that was 
enough. Here we are asking the oil and gas to 
increase it 100%. We're not questioning that and 
all I've said is that if we're going to do that 
lets give some incentative to other oil companies 
who may want to drill in Utah. And I'm not 
talking about above the areas in northeastern 
Utah. I'm talking about the poor areas, the areas 
that are not oil rich so to speak. Emery County, 
Uintah Basin, Carbon County, Grand County, this 
gives them some added incentive. What it rarely 
does is to drill a well and they are not taxed as 
severance tax for one year after production. This 
will allow them to recover some of their drilling 
costs and give a little added incentive to an oil 
industry to move into Utah. And since we're going 
to put this severance tax on, and like I say, if 
we're going to pass this bill we better have these 
amendments in it and Representative Richards 
there's assurance they are going to pass without 
them. I heard you were in support of this 
amendment. 
Mr. Speaker: We've had a summation now. Call for the vote. 
All those in favor of the Dmitrich amendment which 
has not been divided and which is found on the 
pink sheet. 
Sen. Dmitrich: Mr. Speaker, I think agreed to divide it for 
Representative ?. 
Rep. ? I don't want it (inaudible) 
Sen. Dmitrich: (Inaudible) okay. 
Mr. Speaker: . . . withdrew his request. So we'll now place 
the motion. It has not been divided. All those 
in favor. 
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Mr. Speaker: 
? 
Mr. Speaker: 
Rep. Brown: 
? 
Rep. Brown: 
Mr. Speaker: 
Rep. Meacham: 
Mr. Speaker: 
Mr. Speaker. Point of information. That 
amendment then deletes the retrospective portion 
of this bill. Is that correct? That would mean 
it would not take effect for 60 days after this 
session would effectively reduce the revenue on it 
$10,000,000 right? Point of information. That's 
all. I just want to know. 
It would deletes lines 18 and 19. 
Okay. 
Representative Brown. 
Can we still desire to have this motion divided. 
Mr. Speaker, point of origin. 
I'm requesting that this motion be divided. 
State your point Representative Meacham. 
You closed the vote. I know what his point is. 
We'd be glad to address that if this motion fails. 
I have no objection address that after. All we 
have to do is insert that language that you want 
Representative Brown and my point of order is that 
you called for the vote and we should vote on it. 
Okay, we're going to call for a vote now on the 
Dmitrich amendment which has not been divided. 
All those in favor of the Dmitrich amendment say 
aye (Aye). Oppose (No). Motion carries. Bill is 
amended. The five standing we'll have a division. 
There being five standing voting is now open on 
the Dmitrich amendment. All present having voted. 
Voting will be closed. The motion carries. The 
bill is amended. 
? Mr. Speaker. Mr. Speaker. 
Mr. Speaker: Dmitrich. 
Sen. Dmitrich: Mr. Speaker, to follow-up with that other 
amendment to clarify the problem that 
Representative Brown had I now yield to 
Representative Brown to make that amendment, 
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Mr. Speaker: We're next going to go to Representative 
t 
Rep. ? Thank you Mr. Speaker. I rise for the purpose of 
making an amendment. I'll be brief recognizing the 
constraints of time. It's the four page amendment 
that you have in you book and I'd like to add to 
it one change on page 4. In the sixth amendment. 
Number 6 under the subheading 6 on that page where 
it reads the underlined language reads "to the 
occupation tax revenues trust fund" and that 
point insert the word, the phrase "which is 
created July 1, 1985." Let me have a second to 
the amendment and I'll speak to it. 
Mr. Speaker: We have a motion then by Representative Tomlinson 
in the second. Anyone to that motion? 
? I'd just like to explain he amendment. 
Mr. Speaker: (Inaudible) 
? Its pretty straight-forward. It looks formidable 
(End of Recording) 
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